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What we ask of law
forthcoming, 133 Yale Law Journal -- (2023)
Aziz Z. Huq*
Abstract
A minimal, reasonably uncontroversial, demand of a legal system is that it should stabilize a
polity against the chance hazards of ordinary violence and soften the blows of extraordinary,
destabilizing misfortune. Law in the contemporary United States, however, has not abated the
lethal toll of violent crime, the serial mass shootings of children, the endless flow of racialized
police violence, or even the toll of insurrectionary violence that shadows democratic politics. The
gap between law’s operation in practice and its ultimate aspirations toward social order offers
a hint that something in our dominant working model of law, and its relation to an ideal of the
rule of law, is awry.
This review essay reconsiders the presently dominant assumptions about a well-functioning legal
system to in light of new evidence of how law operates across a wider historical and geographic
panorama. This exercise in historically contextualization has implications for the choice of a
sound working definition of law, a clear understanding of the latter’s relationship to the rule of
law, and an accurate sense of whether law is likely to advance or retard emancipatory projects
of social reform, especially pertaining to racial injustice. The occasion for this reconsideration
is Professor Fernanda Pirie’s book The Rule of Laws: A 4,000-Year Quest to Order
the World, an extraordinary and ambitious effort to fuse historical, anthropological,
sociological, and legal learning across continents and eras into a single narrative arc. Starting
with the historical materials eloquently marshalled by Pirie, I refine a new ‘polythetic’ definition
of law that is distinct from the demotic definition of law commonly used in both popular and
juristic discourse. To illuminate its distinctive form and implications, I bring this ‘polythetic’
definition into conversation with the leading jurisprudential theories of H.L.A. Hart and Lon
Fuller. This sparks new ways of thinking about the relation of law to the state on the one hand,
and about legalistic aspirations of the rule of law on the other. In concluding, I consider the
implications of the polythetic definition of law for the pressing contemporary problem of how
law relates to projects of racial hierarchy or reform.

Frank and Bernice Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Fernanda
Pirie, who graciously commented on a draft. Claudia Brittenham, Tom Ginsburg, Brian Leiter and Fred
Schauer gave me invaluable comments on issues outside my very limited domain of expertise. Eric Eisner and
Aaron Liskov both improved the piece with close reads and comments. All errors are mine.
*
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What we ask of law
(reviewing The Rule of Laws: : A 4,000-Year Quest to Order the World,
By FERNANDA PIRIE, BASIC BOOKS 2021)
Introduction
Much is asked of law, even if we seem of late to reap dismayingly scant returns. Take a
minimal, reasonably uncontroversial, demand: In its totality, a legal system should realize the
Hobbesian sovereign’s prerogative of establishing civil order.1 It should stabilize a polity against
the chance hazards of ordinary violence, and soften the blows of extraordinary, destabilizing
misfortune. But, in the contemporary United States, has law succeeded at this modest task? It
has not had a visible constraining effect on serial mass shootings of children.2 It has not abated
the lethal toll of violent crime, which is balefully associated in the public mind with racial
minorities.3 As a correlative, it has done little to stanch the seemingly endless flow of racialized
police violence paid for and directed by the state.4 And the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on
January 6, 2021 suggests that law no longer “break[s] the irregular rule of the street” to create
space for the tedious civility of representative, democratic politics.5 Look beyond violence to
larger threats to public order, and law’s ambitions fare little better. It played a questionable role
in responses to the global financial crisis.6 Nor could it sustain a public consensus robust enough
to combat the respiratory plague that had (as of early 2022) taken more than a million American
lives.7 Neither state nor private violence and disorder, in short, is firmly circumscribed by the
institutions fashioned of American law. To be sure, we no longer reside in a Hobbesian state of
nature. But for those most vulnerable to the predictable crush of private and state violence—
especially racialized minorities in the United States—that thought might well come as cold

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651).
For a vivid statement of this point, see Alex Kingsbury, Gunman in __ Kills __, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/27/opinion/editorials/american-mass-shootingstexas.html?action=click&module=Well&pgtype=Homepage&section=Editorials
3 Jeffrey P. Brantingham, Jeremy Carter, John MacDonald, Chris Melde, and George Mohler, Is the recent surge in
violence in American cities due to contagion?, 76 J. CRIM. JUST. 101848, 101848 (2021) (noting 30 percent rise in
homicide rates in 34 American cities between 2019 and 2020). On the association of race and criminality, see
Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCH. 876,
881 (2004) (exploring “the extent to which Black faces are brought before the footlights of attention when the
concept of crime is activated”).
4 Roland G. Fryer Jr, An empirical analysis of racial differences in police use of force, 127 J. POL. ECON. 1210, 1213-14
(2019) (reporting racial disparities in both the use of nonlethal and lethal force of up to 50 percent); see also PAUL
A. GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 113 (2021) (“The bare fact of repeated police killings
of black Americans, especially when the victims are innocent of any crime and/or the police receive no
consequence for the killing, is itself a challenge to the US’s self-conception as a rule of law state ….”).
5 Max Weber, National Character and the Junkers, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 395 (H.H. Gerth
and C.W. Wright, eds. 1958). Perhaps instead, our insurrectionary constitutions invite irregular political action.
6 On the legality of many responses to the 2007-09 global financial crisis, see ERIC A. POSNER, LAST RESORT:
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FUTURE OF BAILOUTS (2018). The most direct confrontation between law and
economic emergency came in the September 2012 decision by the German Constitutional Court to limit
Germany’s participation in the European Stability Mechanism. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, ,2 BvR 1390,
1421, 1438, 1439, 1440/12 (2012).
7 Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (last visited March 8, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/covid-cases.html (recording 950,000 deaths from COVID-19
in the United States). On partisan divergences around pandemic-related measures, see Zalman Rothschild, Free
Exercise Partisanship, 107 CORNELL L. REV. -- (forthcoming 2022).
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comfort.8 To their jaundiced and weary ears, the pronouncements of the law might rather
sound like a tinnitus from “impotent grandfathers feebly scold[ing].”9
Nevertheless, encomiums for law and the related (but not identical) normative ideal of
‘the rule of law’ keep gushing forth. In many contexts, the ideas of “law” and the “rule of law”
are used almost interchangeably such that it is difficult to see where one ends, and the other
begins. For example, Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court--most recently Neil Gorsuch and
Antonin Scalia—routinely rhapsodize “the rule of law” as preferable to the “rule of men.”10
Law, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor once intoned, guards against a government driven by
“caprice, passion, bias, and prejudice.”11 Law, they say, lays the groundwork for “rudimentary
justice.”12 It “protects the rights and liberties of all Americans …. [For] without the rule of law,
any rights are meaningless.”13 The rule of law, for academic lawyers like Richard Fallon,
remains “central to our political and rhetorical traditions, possibly even to our sense of national
identity.”14 His sentiment echoes across the Anglophone world. In an influential book, the
English Law Lord Tom Bingham has concluded that “it is on the observance of the rule of law
that the quality of government depends.”15 Bingham’s vision of “government in accordance
with performable and established norms” is twice the age of America: It has been traced back
to the thirteenth-century English jurist Henri de Bracton.16 Its influence perhaps reached an
acme in 1975, when the preeminent Marxist historian Edward Thompson pronounced that
“the notion of the rule of law is an unqualified good”17—much to fellow travelers’ dismay.18
Underlying many of these endorsements of law, I think, is an implicit ‘folk theory’ of
how law—how a well-ordered legal system, not just a single rule or enactment in isolation—
actually works, and how it produces the social good of the “rule of law.”19 I cannot point to a
This review, and the book under consideration, focus on domestic rather than international law. The
understanding of what it means to ‘comply’ with international law is more complex, and been subject to
competing narratives over time. See John Fabian Witt, The View from the U.S. Leviathan: Histories of International Law
in the Hegemon (January 22, 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4014826 (surveying the field).
9 W.H., Auden, Law like Love, in SELECTED POEMS 97-98 (Edward Mendelsohn, ed. 2007).
10 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2438 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989) (offering a “dichotomy between
‘general rule of law’ and ‘personal discretion to do justice’ as central to the rule of law).
11 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 475 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The association
of the rule of law with the constraint of official action goes back to a Victorian legal theorist who was one of the
early adopters of the term ‘rule of law.’ A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 181 205 (2d ed. 1959).
12 Scalia, supra note 10, at 1778. Scalia’s point here is embedded in a larger argument about the desirability of
rules over standards as legal norms. Id. at 1185 (“I believe that the establishment of broadly applicable general
principles is an essential component of the judicial process.”). But his identity theorem of rules with the rule of
law is implausibly demanding of language. Timothy A.O. Endicott, The Impossibility of the Rule of Law, 19
OXFORD J. L. STUD. 1, 7-8 (1999).
13 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, nominee
to be Chief Justice of the United States).
14 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., ‘The Rule of Law’ As A Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997).
15 TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 173 (2011).
16 JOHN PHILLIP REID, RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND
EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 4-5 (2004).
17 E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND H UNTERS 267 (1975). s
18 Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L. J. 561 (1977).
19 In the balance of this essay, I use the word “law” to refer to a legal system in the sense of an “organized
system[] of rules—that is … social or political systems in which human conduct is governed in one way or
another.” Jeremy Waldron, Positivism and legality: Hart's equivocal response to Fuller, 83 NYU L. REV. 1135, 1139
(2008) [hereinafter “Waldron, Positivism and legality”].
8
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single place where this model is written down. It is not, to be clear in advance, the famous
jurisprudential concept of law offered by legal positivists working in the vein of H.L.A. Hart
(which I will come back later).20 It is demotic, not a formal, understanding. It hence operates
as a pre-theoretical presupposition that can be silently shared by the conservative jurist, the
liberal legal scholar, and the Marxist historian. Once stated, I hope it will seem sufficiently
familiar and intuitive that it can lay claim to a measure of generality as an operative
presumption behind much everyday talk of law and the rule of law.21
I call demotic folk theory of law the ‘conveyer belt model of law.’ It has three elements,
which correspond to the moments of law’s production, application, and output. First, the law
typically has a temporally distinct origin in an officially authorized source.22 Its origin is thus
known and fixed, both in time and institutional source, and legitimated by pedigree.23 Second,
the law is later applied by a cadre of specialized state actors, usually judges, to subsequent
disputes involving new facts and new parties. Law not only has a proper pedigree but a
distinctive armature.24 And third, applying that body of early-forged law in new cases creates
general benefits beyond the localized good of resolving a specific dispute.25 The larger good most
commonly associated with law relates to the possibility of binding of powerful actors in a society,
especially those wearing badges of state authority, in ways that prevent capricious, whimsical,
or self-interested action. This last result is often captured in the otherwise vague term “rule of

I discuss that concept of law infra in Part III.A.
In the following description, I offer examples in the margin of each element of the conveyer-belt theory of law.
22 This assumption informs many complaints about judicial overreach. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644,
686 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not what
it should be.”). This is the idea that the law comprises a fixed set of authoritative sources, and that judges are
strictly bound within them.
This is one point on which the conveyer-belt theory diverges from legal positivism (albeit not the only
one): The claim in the text is not at all the same as the “sources thesis” in legal positivism, which holds that the
“existence and content [of law] can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort to any
evaluative argument.” Joseph Raz, Authority, law and morality, 68 The Monist 295, 296 (1985); see also H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 45-49 (postscript ed. Penelope Bulloch & Joseph Raz, 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter “HART,
CONCEPT OF LAW”] (considering custom as laws, and concluding that law need not originate in a “deliberate
law-creating act”). Under the sources thesis, law does not need to originate in an official source, but can emerge
as custom and be recognized as such.
23 The obvious exception to the conveyer-belt model at this step is the common law, which has long been
understood as a “practised discipline of practical reasoning.” Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 601 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., 2002) [hereinafter “Postema, Common Law”]; see also A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal
Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: SECOND SERIES 77, 94 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973)
(characterizing the common law as an unwritten “body of practices observed and ideas received by a caste of
lawyers”). This is a second instance of divergence between the legal positivist’s view of law and the conveyer-belt
model. The former can more easily accommodates custom and the common law. For a discussion of how
custom is another example that the legal positivist can accommodate, but not necessarily the conveyer-belt
model, see Neil Duxbury, Custom as Law in English Law, 76 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 337, 339 (2017). The discomfort
many modern American scholars and jurists have respecting the common law likely has to do with the
background force of the conveyer belt model. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign
Relations, 106 GEO. L.J. 1825, 1833 (2018) (describing a “trend away from common law reasoning in foreign
relations cases,” which is one of the most important redoubts of federal common law).
24 The Supreme Court often describes its relation to written law in something akin to these terms. See, e.g., James
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535-36 (1991) (noting that “the declaratory theory of law according
to which the courts are understood only to find the law, not to make it ... comports with our received notions of
the judicial role”(citations omitted)).
25 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 804 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“A judiciary
capable of performing this function, owing fidelity to no person or party, is a ‘longstanding Anglo–American
tradition,’ … , an essential bulwark of constitutional government, a constant guardian of the rule of law.”).
20
21
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law.”26 I call all this a “conveyer-belt” model because it imagines a linear and unidirectional
pathway from written law, to judicial application, and then to a state characterized by the rule
of law.
In my judgment, the image of a conveyer-belt captures a motivating metaphor
embedded deeply in the self-understandings of many actors within the American legal system.
It formalizes, albeit in rather facile terms, what those actors believe themselves to be doing by
participating in a legal system. It also captures one way in which a normative, evaluative
element of some sort is irreducibly comingled into law’s description. Mere words, it implies,
can and do enchain power, and hence work as a positive force for social good. (This is not to
say, to be clear, that law must meets a moral criterion to count as law.27 It is more simply a
claim that law is a social fact with certain “normative” and also desirable consequences.28)
Specifically, the official act of following or enforcing a duly enacted piece of law mechanically
creates a positive social good of the rule of law—i.e., the binding of powerful actors by ex ante
rules in ways that limit capricious or arbitrary conduct.
So what’s gone wrong? If a folk theory of law is widely held and in good working order,
why doesn’t law do its job of constraining power (especially state power) better? There are, to
be sure, obvious local and contingent reasons for law’s present shortfalls. Specific legislative and
judicial choices elicit the structural conditions of public violence, distrust in the public-health
apparatus, and poorly-regulated security forces. Pick your poison. Yet these observable
shortfalls in law’s ambitions invite the question whether we are not just making bad policy
choices (although we certainly are …), but also whether our understanding of law as a ground
for producing the rule of law is flawed or incomplete. We have reason to suspect as much
because, although its legal system is in reasonably good working order, the United States
struggles to achieve either the imperative of a secure Hobbesian peace or the more ambitious
project of securing common grounds for democratic self-government. If law’s operation and its
aspirations have come this far apart, it is at least reasonable to ask whether something in our
dominant working model of law, and its relation to the rule of law, is not accurate. Perhaps our
expectation that law is a social technology capable of delivering certain social result is simply
implausible. Perhaps we have overlooked law’s limitations by failing to grasp clearly its common
constituent elements. Or perhaps we have just misperceived how law works in the first instance.
Picking up on that last possibility, my aim in this review essay is to re-evaluate the
dominant assumptions about a well-functioning legal system in light of new evidence of how
law operates across a wider historical and geographic panorama, and to elucidate some of the
consequences of a revised model of law for current disputes in legal theory and contemporary
legal debates. By moving away from parochial conceptions of law, and instead asking what
picks out law as a transhistorical social practice, I hope to make some progress toward
understanding the relationship between law’s aspirations, whether formal or normative, and
the elusive ideal of the rule of law. In so doing, I also hope to gain purchase on how law’s modal
vectors facilitate some, but by no means all, kinds of social arrangements.29
On this constraining understanding of the rule of law, see BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW:
HISTORY, THEORY, POLITICS 63-67 (2004).
27 But see H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 624 (1958) (“[T]here
is, in the very notion of law consisting of general rules, something which prevents us from treating it as if morally
it is utterly neutral, without any necessary contact with moral principles.”); see also infra text accompanying – to -.
28 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 30 (2000) (discussing the “normative understanding of law”).
29 A related project of “law and political economy” challenges the suppression of “problems of distribution and
power throughout public and private law.” Jedediah Britton-Purdy et al., Building A Law-and-Political-Economy
Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1791 (2020). That project takes law as a
26
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Such questions are invited by Professor Fernanda Pirie’s new book The Rule of Laws: A
4,000-Year Quest to Order the World.30 As its title suggests, Professor Pirie’s book is an
extraordinarily ambitious effort to fuse historical, anthropological, sociological, and legal
learning across continents and eras into a single narrative arc. It begins with a series of clay
tablets inscribed at the behest of Sumerian dynast Ur-Namma in 2112 B.C.E. with rules for his
city, and closes with the 2015 promulgation of an international agreement on cross-border sales
under the auspices of UNCITRAL.31 Unlike Pirie’s previous monograph on similar themes,32
The Rule of Laws is crafted for a non-specialist audience. It does not foreground theory. But it
can be profitably read alongside that earlier scholarship to extrapolate a more abstract
‘theoretical’ claim about the modal elements of law as a social practice, and, in particular, the
three elements of the conveyer-belt model: Law’s sources, the institutional mechanisms through
which it affects ordinary people, and its ensuing capacity to yield enduring changes to social
relations.
By bringing our leading ideas about law into conversation with Pirie’s work, I hope to
broach several questions about both the theory and the practical promise of law, and its relation
to the rule of law. To begin with, an effort toward de-parochializing our understanding of law
shows up ways in which the conveyer belt model—which I have suggested lurks behind views
of figures as disparate as Gorsuch, Fallon, Bingham and Thompson—does not accurately or
completely capture the actual sources, development, and modal operation of law. Their model
is instead at best contingent and at worst misleading. Pirie’s work also provides an empirically
grounded perspective from which to reconsider widely shared theoretical claims about law. Her
analysis sheds light on the concept of law developed by H.L.A. Hart using a own distinctive
brand of “descriptive sociology.”33 It also has implications for claims about the “morality” of
law made by Lon Fuller.34 That engagement with Fuller’s work also casts a light on the
relationship between the polythetic definition of law and the rule of law, understood as an
aspiration toward the constraint of state power. Finally, that definition’s implications for a
contemporary problematic are worth exploring. I hence conclude by reconsidering the relation
of law to racial hierarchy and subordination.
It is helpful to unpack here the first of these points, since it is central to much of what
follows—how the elements of law, and their relation to the rule of law, vary from the conveyer
given, and then follows the Legal Realists in tracing its formative influence on economic as well as political
arrangements. My project here is to step back one further level of generality, and ask if we really have a firm
grasp on how law works, and how it tends toward some but not other social arrangements. Generality, however,
is necessarily purchased here at the loss of some predictive precision.
30 FERNANDA PIRIE, THE RULE OF LAWS: A 4,000-YEAR QUEST TO ORDER THE WORLD (2021) [hereinafter
“PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS”].
31 Id. at 17-18, 431-32. The UNCITRAL example does not quite come at the end of the book, but it is the
temporally final element of the book.
32 A previous 2013 book prefigures several of the themes in The Rule of Laws in a more theoretical register.
FERNANDA PIRIE, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW (2013) [hereinafter, “PIRIE, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW”]. The
specific relation of law to the modern project of state-building is addressed in Fernanda Pirie, Law before
government: Ideology and aspiration, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207 (2010) [hereinafter “Pirie, Law before
government”]. I also found useful theoretical orientation in an earlier introduction to a collected volume of
anthropological studies. Fernanda Pirie and Judith Scheele, Introduction, in LEGALISM: COMMUNITY AND
JUSTICE (F. Pirie and J. Scheele eds. 2014) [hereinafter “LEGALISM: COMMUNITY AND JUSTICE”].
33 HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at v.
34 See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 660 (1958) (“To
me there is nothing shocking in saying that a dictatorship which clothes itself with a tinsel of legal form can so far
depart from the morality of order, from the inner morality of law itself, that it ceases to be a legal system.”); see
generally LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964) (developing this account further).
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belt model in subtle but consequential ways. In brief, Pirie’s work suggests that law does indeed
have historically recurrent (albeit not invariant) characteristics. But the conveyer belt model
gets these wrong. Law, Pirie shows, connotes written rules of general application maintained
by a hieratic caste. And it is recurrently characterized by an aspiration toward acontextual
generality and atemporality. This aspiration may be best embodied in a written text. Law’s
relation to the state, and to the practical fact of compliance, is in contrast contingent rather
than necessary.
This account differs from the conveyer belt model along three margins. First, it identifies
a subtly but importantly different source for law from the one assumed by the conveyer belt
model. Second, the relationship between the law and the state is not stable in the way that the conveyer
belt model implies. Law is akin to the ordinary commerce in the sense that it can get along
perfectly well without the enforcement and adjudicative institutions ordinarily associated with
the state.35 Indeed, Pirie’s historical work suggests, it is the state and those who aspire to its
command that are the more needy, and hence the overly dependent, party in this relationship.
Finally—and in some tension with Pirie’s own conclusions—her own empirical synthesis
suggests that the relationship of law to the rule of law (again, understood as the project of
constraining state power) is not straightforward. It is instead inconstant and murky. Many social
goods associated with the rule of law—e.g., predictability, stability, and regularity—can be
realized outside the state. And it is possible to envisage a legal system that neither constrains
powerful actors nor adds predictability. Such has long been true of one of the world’s great
legal traditions in China. It is possible, therefore, to have law, as well as a powerful state, without
the rule of law.
A reasonable objection at the outset is whether the inquiries pursued here are
methodologically confused: How can historical materials, marshalled however extensively, speak
to purely conceptual questions about the ‘nature’ of law? Why should history determine the
semantic content of any term? Even if covering laws or other generalizations can be derived
from historical regularities about law, an effort to derive normative conclusions from them
would seem to commit the naturalistic fallacy: It would seem to be deriving normative
prescriptions from social facts. A brief answer here is that law is a concept that does not, and
could not, exist detached from the mine run of actual social practices and actual patterns of
expectations held by participants in legal systems.36 It is possible to talk meaningfully of a
“concept” of law independent of those practices and associated beliefs.37 Obviously, “law”
refers to distinct arrangements across varied jurisdictions at different times. But even if the term
“law” may translate in different ways in different nations at different times, Pirie powerfully
shows that there are also characteristics that recurrently transcend historical contexts, and in
consequence are presupposed by the “ordinary usage” of the term “law” as a transnational and
transhistorical referent.38 As a result, reflection on the possibility conditions of law’s normative
aspirations today can usefully begin with the study of what, historically, has recurrently been
BARRY HAWK, LAW AND COMMERCE IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 14 (2016) (“Men and women in … nine
pre-industrial societies engaged in commerce and trade …. Commerce and trade came before states ….”).
36 See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS ON THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 237
(rev. ed. 2005) (emphasizing group understandings in accounts of law); cf. Jules L. Coleman, Beyond Inclusive Legal
Positivism, 22 RATIO JURIS 359, 359-61 (2009) (describing debate over whether law is exclusively a social
phenomenon between Hart and Ronald Dworkin).
37 This is not a new position. For the classic statement, dating from 1884, see Rudolf von Jhering, In the Heaven of
Legal Concepts: A Fantasy, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 799, 802 (1985).
38 Kenneth Einar Himma, Do Philosophy and Sociology Mix? A Non-Essentialist Socio-Legal Positivist Analysis of the
Concept of Law, 24 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 717, 733 (2004). Himma, however, would criticize what follows here
as “too thin” to establish an adequate concept of law. Id. at 737.
35
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the case with law. This exercise can help us to get past parochial “ideas and procedures” keyed
to present practice that cloud our perceptions and judgments.39 It allows us to reach a more
realistic accounting of what we plausibly ask of law because we better understand what law is.
Pursuing this wider enterprise, I frankly acknowledge that I run the risk of losing sight
of Pirie’s ambitions for her own volume, and straying from job of the reviewer: reviewing the
book rather than deploying it as a footstool for my own asquint aspirations. I hope to avoid that
snare. Part I, in particular, trains closely on Pirie’s text in its riches and demerits alike. But I
can acquit my central obligation up front, right now: As a work aimed at a non-specialist
audience, The Rule of Laws succeeds marvelously. Pirie’s narrative rarely flags or loses interest.
She deftly moves forward in time and space, darting across continents and jurisdictions without
losing a singular narrative thread. She also avoids the facile parsimony that mars many other
humanity-spanning histories written for a popular audience. Hers covers an exhaustive breadth
of human life with clarity and vigor, and without cliché or condescension. No one scholar can
be expert in all of the heterogeneous legal practices she touches. (Certainly, I’m not). So one
might well cavil with details or matters of emphasis.40 But reflect a moment on the absence of
any general text on the history of law—let alone one compassing four millennia within and also
beyond the strictures of state building—and the magnitude of her accomplishment becomes
immediately clear. It is little short of breath-taking.

Bernard Williams, Philosophy as a humanistic discipline, 75 PHILOSOPHY 477, 492 (2000).
To criticize Pirie on the ground that she makes omissions, I think, is a bit churlish: No one could plausibly tell
a global history of law without some omissions. But two omissions are so striking that it would be wrong not to
note them at least in the margin.
First, Pirie’s account is rich when it comes to Europe, Asia, and (to some extent) Oceania. But it has
almost nothing to say about the legal systems of indigenous groups of North and South America, and very little
to say about the law of sub-Saharan Africa, and in particular the great empires of Asante, Mali, Songhai, and
Zimbabwe. At least some of the precolonial African experience can be understood as covered by Pirie’s
treatment of Islamic law. See, e.g., A. J. H. Goodwin, The Medieval Empire of Ghana, 12 S. AFRICAN
ARCHAEOLOGICAL BULL. 108, 110-11 (1957) (discussing the use of Islamic law during the reign of Malian
emperor Mansa Musa), but is there more to be said about precolonial African law? See, e.g., WERNER F. MENSKI,
COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA 380-402 (2006) (offering
a brief survey of that field, and arguing for the existence of law in this period). On the pre-Columbian Americas,
Pirie cites the European destruction of Aztec and Inca records to explain the lacuna in her narrative. PIRIE,
RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 340-41. There are some accounts of Mesoamerican law. See, e.g., Jerome A.
Offner and Elizabeth Lambourn, The Future of Aztec Law, in Legal Encounters in the Medieval Globe (Elizabeth
Lambourn and Carol Symes, eds. 2016); see also DIEGO DURÁN, THE HISTORY OF THE INDIES OF NEW SPAIN
569 (Doris Heyden trans., 1994) (1581) (“Yet others made records of the laws..."). Given the history of malign
neglect of both Mesoamerican and African law, cf. MENSKI, supra, at 380 (noting the “barely hidden
undercurrent of African laws and their contributions to jurisprudence), this is an unfortunate gap.
Second, as we will see, Pirie makes claims about the relation of law to the normative concept of the rule
of law. The twentieth century, however, was indelibly scarred by regimes ostensibly characterized by law but
which committed atrocities of catastrophic cruelty. How law operated under these circumstances provides
important data in respect to some of the claims she makes about law’s normativity. Consider one preeminently
evil regime: In early 1942, Adolf Hitler first told German judges that “the nation is not here for them but they
are here for the nation,” and yet a month later barred Nazi officials from pressuring or interfering with any legal
proceeding. Hans Petter Graver, Why Adolf Hitler spared the judges: judicial opposition against the Nazi state, 19 GERMAN
L. J. 845, 846 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Without minimizing the horrors of the Nazi regime,
it seems fair to say that the latter had a complex relationship with law. The other example that would have been
useful to address is Soviet law. See, e.g., JUDAH ZELITCH, SOVIET ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (2018).
The law’s relation to normativity under the Nazi regime, of course, was raised in an important in article by
Gustav Radbruch, and then provided the seed for an important debate between Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart.
Gustav Radbruch, Statutory lawlessness and supra-statutory law, 26 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2006) (originally
published in 1946). For a subtle account of Radbruch’s thought, and Fuller’s reaction, see Stanley L. Paulson,
Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch, and the ‘Positivist’ Theses, 13 L & PHIL. 313, 323-24 (1994).
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Part I introduces The Rule of Laws, focusing on its implicit definition of “law.” Part II
then derives from Pirie’s work a new, general accounting of law, which I call the ‘polythetic’
definition. To be clear, I can’t ascribe this theoretical claim to her (or blame her for its flaws!)
Part II also contrasts this definition to the conveyer-belt model, and demonstrates important, if
nuanced, divergences. Part III considers implications of a polythetic definition for key elements
of leading jurisprudential theories of Hart and Fuller, with particular attention to the relation
of law to the state and to the rule of law. Finally, Part IV takes up one practical application—
the relation of law to racial hierarchy and projects of racial reform—as a way of showing that
a highly abstract account of law can nonetheless yield (modest) insight on practical, present
problems.
I.

Law as it Was: A Polythetic Definition

The Rule of Laws offers a synoptic history of law as a social practice across almost the full
breadth of recorded human history.41 I am not aware of another book aimed at the general
reader with a similar ambition.42 There was a wave of scholarly interest in “legal pluralism” in
the 1970s and 1980s.43 This focused largely on colonial encounters and synchronic conflicts
between different legal orders.44 But the legal pluralism literature never generated an analogous
unitary text canvassing the historical development of law as such. Today, as interest in legal
pluralism has ebbed,45 relatively few scholars working in the American legal academy could
pull off such a feat. A professor of the anthropology of law at Oxford University, Fernanda Pirie
has unique standing for such an enterprise. Formerly a practicing barrister (like Herbert
Hart),46 and an expert in Tibetan law,47 Pirie co-supervised the massive comparative-law
But see supra note 40 for exceptions.
There have been scholarly efforts at a tour de horizon of law through history. See, e.g., 1 CHARLES WIGMORE,
PANORAMA OF THE WORLD’S LEGAL SYSTEMS, at xi (1936) (characterizing the scope of the work as extending
to “sixteen principal legal systems, past and present, form the subject-Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Hebrew,
Chinese, llindu, Greek, Roman, Japanese, Mohammedan, Keltic, Slavic, Germanic, Maritime, Ecclesiastical,
Romanesque, Anglican”); see also H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE
DIVERSITY IN LAW (5th ed. 2014). Other leading texts focus on the “Western” legal tradition, see, e.g., HAROLD J.
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1985), or train
more narrowly on the history of ideas, see, e.g., CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 1958). Glenn’s effort is perhaps the closest parallel to Pirie’s.
43 See Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 245 (2009) (defining “legal
pluralism” as “a situation in which two or more laws (or legal systems) coexist in (or are obeyed by) one social
field” and noting the hey-day of its study in the 1970s and 1980s). The leading theoretical formulation of legal
pluralism is by the late Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 869 (1988). William Twining
embedded legal pluralism within a broader account of globalization. William Twining, General jurisprudence:
understanding law from a global perspective 70-74 (2009). And Brian Tamanaha has brought pluralism into
conversation with Hartian positivism. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Socio-legal positivism and a general jurisprudence,
21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001).
44 Early contributions defined legal pluralism as a function of the colonial encounter. See MICHAEL BARRY
HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS (1975).
45 A recent publication that aims to revive interest in legal pluralism is The Oxford Handbook of Global Legal Pluralism
(Paul Berman ed., 2020). Its editor explains legal pluralism as “a … complicated descriptive account of the
interaction of normative systems, the strategic actions of individuals and groups in deploying these multiple
systems to pursue their interests, and the subtle processes by which even norms without coercive power can
change legal consciousness and have impact over time.” Paul Schiff Berman, Understanding Global Legal Pluralism:
From Local to Global, from Descriptive to Normative, in id. at 12. The majority of the handbook’s chapters, though,
concern how contemporary legal systems interact, rather than how law has developed over time. That is, they
concern the conflict, rather than the historical genealogy, of law.
46 Maitland Chambers, Fernanda Pirie (last visited Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.maitlandchambers.com/ourpeople/barristers/associate-members/fernanda-pirie.
47 See Fernanda Pirie, Legal Ideology in Tibet, University of Oxford China Center (last visited Mar. 17, 2022),
https://www.chinacentre.ox.ac.uk/research/legal-ideology-in-tibet-politics-practice-and-religion/
41
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“Oxford Legalism” project.48 This effort “brought together scholars from anthropology,
history, and other disciplines to compare wide-ranging empirical examples,” and yielded four
rich and diverse edited volumes from Oxford University Press.49 Fingering the indices of these
four volumes, it is easy to see the ground upon which Pirie built her impressive, synoptic
account of law in the historical and geographical round. Further, she approaches her topic
credentialed by an immersion in two very different legal systems (English and Tibetan), as well
as by a command of the leading comparative evidence of law’s historic spread and diffusion.
No review of her work usefully gainsays this unique epistemological grounding. Worthwhile
engagement instead must focus on the theoretical apparatus that sustains her narrative, or
alternatively must use her account as grist for new theoretical insight into the social technology
of law in wide-angle historical perspective.50
To this end, this Part spins out theoretical commitments animating The Rule of Laws
along two different axes. A history of law as a social technology has to start with a definition of
sorts of its subject-matter. I thus begin by fleshing out the implicit definition of law Pirie’s study
applies. I next ask whether regularities emerge from Pirie’s history about the manner in which
law nurtures and palpates the social world. The working model of the law that emerges from
this inquiry diverges in useful ways from the conveyer belt model that is now dominant.
A.

The Historical and Comparative Taxon of “Law”

Pirie’s history of law begins chronologically with clay tables containing a Mesopotamian
legal code circa 2112 B.CE.51 The narrative that follows initially moves, chapter by chapter,
between the cities of the ancient Middle East; the Aryan civilization of the Gangetic flood plain;
the Zhou kingdoms across what later would be known as China; the ancient Mediterranean
civilizations of Greece, Rome, and Constantinople; and the Merovingian, Lombard, and Saxon
courts of the early Middle Ages. Different geographical categories receive either one or two
chapters apiece. Charting this trajectory, Pirie neatly reverses conventional teleologies of law.
Having begun with the proto-state of Ur, she first interleaves chapters on ‘major’ civilizations
with discussions of law at the “margins” of the urbanizing world (in sites such Ireland, Iceland,
Kievan Rus’, and Armenia), and law “beyond the state” (on the Tibetan steppe, the Kabylia
highlands of northeastern Algeria, and mafia-dominated Sicily). The result of this sequencing
is an implicit repudiation of triumphalist narratives of historical ‘development’ that place
contemporary states at an apex. Instead, Pirie offers a more diverse, yet horizontal, mosaic of
historical vignettes about “law” scattered across social, historical, and institutional contexts—
one without a single vector of monotonically increasing complexity or sophistication.52
What, then, unites these vignettes? What transforms a scintillating cascade of diverse
stories into a single image? And what excludes other vectors of social organization from the

The project was co-convened with Paul Presch and Judith Scheele. Email from Fernanda Pirie (Apr. 20, 2022)
(on file with author).
49 LEGALISM: ANTHROPOLOGY AND HISTORY (Paul Dresch and Hannah Skoda, eds, 2012); LEGALISM:
COMMUNITY AND JUSTICE (Fernanda Pirie and Judith Scheele, eds, 2014); LEGALISM: RULES AND CATEGORIES
(Paul Dresch and Judith Scheele, eds, 2015); LEGALISM: PROPERTY AND OWNERSHIP (Georgy Kantor, Tom
Lambert, and Hannah Skoda, eds, 2017).
50 I expect experts in specific bodies of ancient law could identify lacuna or distortions; what else are they for?
51 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 17.
52 The internal diversity of the category ‘law’ is recognized in H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, in
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 21, 22 (1983) (noting that the “range of cases to which [the word
‘law’] is applied has a diversity that baffles the initial attempt to extract any principle behind the application”).
48
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term law?53 The binding assumption of the book, of course, is that there is a coherent single
category of law that can be pursued, like Ariadne’s thread, through the historical maze. To
understand the story Pirie is telling, it is thus necessary to start by asking how that thread is
braided together. Surprisingly, The Rule of Laws presents no threshold definition of its central
organizing taxon.54 To the contrary, Pirie offers a series of negatives that eliminate obvious,
demotic denotings. Law, she says, “does not always recognize[] territorial boundaries”; it
sometimes lacks “efficiency, authority, and efficacy”; and it often “hardly … contributed to the
smooth running of their societies.”55 Rather than stipulate the frame of her canvas as it is first
stretched, Pirie’s method is thus inductive. She starts with what are indubitably examples of
ancient laws, literally carved onto clay tablets and stele in the first of Mesopotamian city states.
She then works incrementally outward by sketching out other examples. Law, in her
portraiture, is not a crisply defined conceptual form pegged out in advance. It is rather what
Pirie calls a “technique” that emerges periodically to resolve certain problems.56 The contours
of this “technique” emerge from an analysis that starts with a set of historical ‘core’ cases and
then pushes outward until the label ceases to be plausible. Elsewhere, she has written that her
process begins with “ordinary language” and heeds “form rather than function, rules more than
command, and legalism rather than conflict resolution.”57 The distinguishing hallmarks of
“law,” under this method at least, are outputs of an inquiry working stepwise across a
vertiginously varied historical landscape.
B.

Theorizing Law as it Was

In an earlier academic monograph, Pirie offered a more extensive theoretical gloss on
her approach to the comparative and historical study of law. This earlier work is reasonably
read in conjunction with The Rule of Laws to give the latter a crisper theoretical edge. We can
usefully start by asking how a definition of the word “law” might be reached.
At the threshold, Pirie observes that law is a “category of the English-speaking world”
that has no necessary or precise analog even in historically related contexts such as Ancient

Writing in the legal pluralism school, Sally Falk Moore eschewed the term “law” in favor of “[t]he semiautonomous social field,” defined in terms of its capacity to “generate rules and coerce or induce compliance to
them.” Sally Falk Moore, Law and social change: the semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate subject of study, 7 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 719, 722 (1972). Moore underscored the imbrication of several fields, with “the law” being enforced
through pressures “emanat[ing] from the several social milieu in which an individual participates.” Id. at 729;
Merry, supra note 34, at 880 (noting the “dialectical, mutually constitutive relation between state law and other
normative orders”). Even though this resistance to a hard barrier between “law” and other normative orders
“confounds the analysis” by making law an essentially boundless category, legal pluralists were not able to
“clearly demarcate[] a boundary between normative orders that can and cannot be called law.” Id. at 878-79.
Boundary conditions offered within that literature were hardly satisfying. Some, for example, suggested an
approach keyed to whether “the binary code of legal/illegal” was used. Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Legal
Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1451 (1992). Even setting aside the difficulty of translating the terms
“legal/illegal” across cultures and histories, it is not clear what unites the use of this terminology, and why the
“binary” character of a judgment should be so important. Think here of the familiar debate in 1L classes about
whether a tort plaintiff or defendant should prevail, and further whether their interests are protected by a
property rule or a liability rule. There is nothing distinctively binary about the resulting choice.
54 Nor, indeed, does she offer a definition of the rule of law, although she says that it is “as ancient as the law
itself.” PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 14. In this same passage, she also appears to equate the mere fact
of writing down rules with the constraint of powerful state actors, and hence the rule of law. Id. As I develop in
the main text, I think The Rule of Laws contains a more subtle and interesting account of the rule of law.
55 Id. at 3.
56 Id. at 12.
57 PIRIE, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 9.
53
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Greek and Roman societies.58 There is a long tradition in that “English-speaking” world of
defining law in relation to the state. Writing in 1832, John Austin defined the province of
jurisprudence as “positive law: law, simply and strictly so called: or law set by political superiors
to political inferiors.”59 In work published posthumously almost a century later, the sociologist
Max Weber argued that there was a necessary relationship between law and “physical or
psychological coercion … applied … to bring about compliance.”60 More recently, legal
scholar Simon Roberts has resisted the legal pluralism framing of jurisprudence by insisting
that the idea of law “is a concomitant of centralizing process” associated with “the nation
state.”61 He would inscribe a perimeter around law to exclude, say, the Tibetan law codes that
Pirie’s fieldwork elaborated. The term “rule of law” is also a distinctly Anglo-American term
lacking in precise analogs in other languages. Although the continental European tradition uses
similar vocabulary—the German term ‘Rechtstaat” for example—the seemingly parallel terms
do not capture quite the same idea as ‘rule of law.’62
On one level, these disputes admit of no resolution. Semantically, there is no way of
simply looking across linguistic divides and asking naively what counts as ‘law’ given the
specificity with which that English term has been employed.63 To the contrary, there is a quite
specific way in which looking for cognates for “law” across linguistic boundaries risks serious
error: Pirie observes that the English-speaking term “law” is “firmly associated with the nation
state” even though “what look like legal codes” are elsewhere often to be found outside the legal
context.64 Reflecting on her fieldwork in Lakadh, Pirie observes that “some societies seem to
do very well without law when settling disputes.”65 To assume the forms of law in “the Englishspeaking world” are canonical is to miss the contingency of the relations between law and statebuilding, between law and order-maintenance, and perhaps much more besides. The same is
likely true of the term “rule of law.”
But such observations leave Pirie in a dilemma. She might join the legal pluralist
scholarship66 in rejecting the Scylla of state-centered parochialism (law is just what we, the
English-speaking peoples, call it). But this pushes her toward the Charybdis of definitional
hyperinflation: If law is to not definitionally affiliated to the state, that is, how can “law” be
distinguished from non-legal systems of normative ordering that purport to instruct people on

Id. at 4-5.
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 9-19 (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds. Weidenfeld
&B Nicolson 1954) (1832).
60 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 34 (G. Roth and R. Wittich, eds., 1968)
61 Simon Roberts, After government? On representing law without the state, 68 MODERN L. REV. 1, 13 (2005).
62 N.W. Barber, The Rechtsstaat and the Rule of Law, 53 U. TORONTO L. J. 443, 448-49 (2003) [hereinafter
“Barber, The Rechtsstaat”] (discussing Hans Kelsen’s account of the Rechtsstaat and distinguishing it from the
rule of law).
63 Reliance on naïve translation to demarcate the bounds of law also risks making meaningful generalization
impossible. Cf. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 25 (1973) (“Theoretical formulations
[can] hover so low over the interpretations they govern that they don’t make much sense or hold much interest
apart from them.”).
64 PIRIE, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 5; PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 398-99
(describing Tibetan nomadic “tribes’ laws” despite their lack of a state apparatus); Pirie, Law before government,
supra note 32, at 215 -17 (describing “law without government”).
65 PIRIE, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 5.
66 This was known as the fallacy of “legal centralism.” See Merry, supra note --, at 374 (rejecting “the ideology of
legal centralism,” which was “the notion that the state and system of lawyers, courts, and prisons is the only form
of ordering”); John Griffiths, What is legal pluralism?. 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 1 (1986)
(criticizing “legal centralism” for privileging the “moral and political claims of the national state”).
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how to act on pain of social sanction?67 Custom, tradition, and even fashion fall into this class.68
If law isn’t just that which is associated with the state, in other words, isn’t it almost everywhere?
At the very least, this view engenders a persisting, difficult boundary dispute over where law
runs out that does not arise if “[t]he relation between custom and law is, basically, one of
contradiction, not continuity.”69
Pirie’s exit from this dilemma is to stipulate that the category of law does not have a
precise, transcultural definition. It is instead a “polythetic classification,” i.e., it is a “class
composed by sporadic resemblances.”70 Its study hence involves a cross-cultural search for
“recurrent features amongst the class of phenomena that bear a family resemblances one to
another … without assuming we can identify a set of common or essential features.”71 The
study of law is hence less akin to physics, where definitions are hard-edged and exacting, and
much more like biology, where taxonomies tend to be riddled with exceptions and caveats.72 I
detect a debt here to Michael Oakeshott, who argued for a jurisprudence that “seeks rather than
dogmatically delivers, a framework for explanation that relates and makes epistemically
coherent … otherwise partial conceptions and approaches.”73 There is also an echo of Hart’s
(fleeting) claim that law is “complex of normally concomitant but distinct elements.”74 Yet
Pirie’s definition is more demanding than the anodyne assertion that “different cultures have

For a version of this critique, see Simon Roberts, Against Legal Pluralism: Some Reflections on the Contemporary
Enlargement of the Legal Domain, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 95, 105 (1998) (criticizing the “unstable epistemological
and methodological climate” of legal pluralism).
68 Think of the ‘no white after labor day’ injunction. Cf. Auden, supra note 9 (“Law is the clothes men wear/
Anytime, anywhere .…”).
69 Stanley Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, 38 SOC. RES. 42, 44 (1971).
70 PIRIE, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 8 (citing Rodney Needham, Polythetic classification: convergence
and consequences, 10 MAN 349, 352 (1975)); accord Jeremy Waldron, What is Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 313, 317 (1985) (“[I]n jurisprudence as in all philosophy, it is a mistake to think that particulars can be
classified under general terms only on the basis of specified common features.”)..
71 PIRIE, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 9; cf. id. at 22 (“[A] model of law should … describe an arc
of actions, movements, words, and sentiments, none of which is likely to be exactly reproduced.”). I do think
Pirie does assume, with Joseph Raz, that “[i]t is part of our understanding of the law that certain social
institutions are instances of law whereas others are non-legal.” Joseph Raz, Can there be a theory of law?, in THE
BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 324 (Martin A. Fielding and William A,
Edmondson, eds., 2005). This “part of our understanding” necessarily supplies the seed—the starting point—for
analogical reasoning.
72 Needham remarks on the use of polythetic definitions in biology. Needham, supra note --, at 352-53 (noting
that “a member of a class of plants did not need to possess all the defining features of the class, and … a deviant
specimen did not need to be assigned to a separate class”). For a good explanation of the problem in biology, see
As Many Exceptions as There Are Rules, BIOLOGICAL EXCEPTIONS (Oct. 29, 2014),
http://biologicalexceptions.blogspot.com/2014/10/almost-this-or-almost-that-must-be-other.html. Note that
this kind of explicandum is disfavored in the increasingly econometric study of law because it does not admit of
easy statistical testing; but no explanation is ever offered in that literature of why conceptual parsimony should
be deduced from methodological limits.
73 Gerald Postema, Jurisprudence as a Sociable Science, 101 VA. L. REV. 869, 881 (2015) (discussing Oakeshott’s work
on law). For another, more general gloss on Oakeshott’s method, see Bhikhu Parekh, The political philosophy of
Michael Oakeshott, 9 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 481, 486 (1979) (explaining Oakeshott’s methodological ambition as
seeking “the logical structure of political life” and giving a “definitive account” of it). Although Pirie does not
make this claim, or cite Oakeshott (so far as I can tell) in either The Rule of Laws or The Anthropology of Laws, she
makes a parallel claim in an earlier coauthored paper, see Naomi Creutzfeldt, Agnieszka Kubal, and Fernanda
Pirie, Introduction: exploring the comparative in socio-legal studies, 12 INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT 377, 378 (2016) (“The
purpose of … comparison is generally analysis and interpretation, rather than evaluation and prescription.”).
74 HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 4. For discussion of this passage, see Frederick Schauer, Hart's
Anti-Essentialism, in (A. Dolcetti, L. Duarte d'Almeida & J. Edwards, eds. 2013).
67
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different conceptions of law.”75 It is less law as concept, more law as observable and recountable
praxis.
Again, I do not see a way of deciding which of these approaches is “correct”: There is
no empirical ground truth against which each can be compared to discern a ‘winner.’ Instead,
it is more profitable to adumbrate the relative strengths and weaknesses of each framing. The
advantage of Pirie’s approach is that it avoids intellectual parochialism. The contingent and
eccentric won’t be mistaken for the needful. It also helps make sense of variation even within
our own cultural sphere that we might otherwise confuse. Consider here the “artificial reason”76
of the uncodified common law as a problem in a legal system, such as the United States, that is
too often taken to have a comically mechanical rule of recognition indexed to exclusively
codified sources.77 Further, her framing draws attention to the way that very similar
“techniques” can take on fresh and unexpected life as the background circumstances of the
state, the economy, and society change. It invites the use of disciplined comparison across
cultural contexts as a means to explore law as a series of variations on a theme. Those variations
hold the possibility of reflecting and hence illuminating each other.
On the other hand, its disadvantage is that it is not a method amenable to replication:
It offers a hermeneutics, but not an algorithm. Different scholars, with subtly varying
conceptions of the core case of “English-speaking law” might extend that term in different ways,
and to different degrees. Indeed, Roberts on this view may well be glossed as applying a variant
on Pirie’s method of polythetic classification. He reaches a different outcome because of his
divergent normative sensitivities.78 That is, he has solved the problem of definitional inflation
but only in a different way to Pirie.
Perhaps the chief strength of Pirie’s method, despite these drawbacks, is the weakness
of its competition. I find neither the narrow view of law criticized by the legal pluralists nor
their seemingly boundless alternative all that useful as analytic categories. Both, to my mind,
yield uncertain berths for embarking upon any meaningfully comparative study of law.79 Both,
despite protestations at neutrality, allow their progenitors to retrace grooves cut by their own
intellectual biases. Taking law as a somewhat promiscuous term of ordinary language is to
recognize its capaciousness and its ability to take on different qualities under different
circumstances. Like the peppered moth that takes up the colors of its surrounding, this
approach has the virtue of promising no more precision than the immediate social context
allows. Practiced well, it forces the analyst to explain what she takes as the core case, and how
she winnows out the central (rather than accidental) features of “law.” A measure of its success,
Oakeshott would say, is whether this method uncovers a class of cases with enough “recurrent
features” and “family resemblances” to hang together in a plausible and insight-generating
way.
Frederick Schauer, The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson, 25 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD.
493, 498 (2005). Schauer’s essay does not answer the question of how to discern whether two different concepts,
framed in distinct verbal forms in different languages, are both ‘concepts of law.’ But his essay is focused on
other questions, and the question is reasonably one he could have seen as beyond his mandate.
76 GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 16-17 (2019).
77 This point has been made forcefully in David A. Strauss The irrelevance of constitutional amendments, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1457 (2000).
78 Indeed, Pirie’s analytic frame is wide enough to encompass Roberts’s core point. See Pirie, Law before
Government, supra note 32, at 221 (“The development of law can … be important to the development of a certain
type of centralized polity.”).
79 Indeed, Austin’s positivist successors viewed him as “clearing and ordering the lawyer’s understanding of his
working rules and concepts.” A.H. Campbell, Introduction, in GEORGIO DEL VECCHIO, JUSTICE: AN
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY, at ix (A.H. Campbell, ed. 1952).
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II.

A Common Tongue of Law

So the strength of a “polythetic” treatment of law will depend on the skill with which a
seed is planted, and the steps taken from that seed to congruent social forms. The Rule of Laws,
glossed as application of that method, reveals a series of commonalities (emphatically not
universal traits) linking together the phenomena that might plausibly be translated as “law” in
a wide variety of cultures. Knitting these different elements together reveals an account of law
that peels away the dominant ‘conveyer belt’ model that, I have suggested, has seized hold of
the modern American imagination.
My aim in this Part is to draw out several common threads of “law” implicit in Pirie’s
synoptic history—without claiming any one is a necessary or definitional element—and then
to set the ensuing image up in contrast to the conveyer belt model that dominates contemporary
theory. To be clear, what follows is my theoretical reconstruction of “law” from the materials
Pirie offers: I claim no certainty that she would agree with the particular abstractions I’ve found
in her work, or how I have organized them.
A.

Law’s Relation to the State

A first element of The Rule of Laws’ narrative concerns what law is not. Unlike Austin’s,
Weber’s, and Roberts’, Pirie’s taxon of law has only a contingent relation to the state—
understood either in terms of institutions of legislation and adjudication or as an instrument of
coercion.80 Law could precede chronologically the state and could derive from non-state
institutions. Religious codes emerging from Judaism, Islam, and Vedic traditions, later adopted
by various bodies of state law, are illustrative.81 The Dharmasutras of Vedic tradition, including
Manu’s 5000-plus line catalog of rules for daily life, emerged from scholarly Brahminic
communities.82 They addressed business matters, such as debt, interest, partnership, and
theft.83 When adopted by governing bodies, they “specified which communities should make
their own rules,” in effect acting as a sort of “meta-level law.”84 Under the Umayyad caliphate,
caliphs appointed judges, or qadis, to administer law. The qadis “probably looked to Qur’anic
norms as much as they could,” but also piggybacked on the “norms and customs” of conquered
territory.85 Similarly, Fatimid leaders in eleventh century Cairo authorized the city’s Jewish
community to manage their own affairs “according to the law of Moses.”86 To the extent that
law arose from a central state, it could “filter[] down” via an administrative web of judges,

Note that this way of phrasing the matter might falsely suggest a transhistorically fixed way of understanding
the state, say, as “an established apparatus of government.” Quentin Skinner, A Genealogy of the Modern State, 162
PROC. BRIT ACAD. 325, 361 (2009). But this ignores “earlier and more explicitly normative ways of thinking
about the state.” Id.
81 See, e.g., PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 34-38, 123-26 (Jewish law); id. at 43-56 (Dharmasutras); and
130-44 (Sharia); see also Merry, supra note --, at 883 (“[S]tate law both constitutes and is constituted by the
normative orders of which it is composed.”).
82 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 54-56. Manu’s Codes dates back at least to the fifth century C.E., and
possibly to the third century C.E., and was probably compiled over several centuries by numerous scribes.
PATRICK OLIVELLE AND SUMAN OLIVELLE. MANU'S CODE OF LAW 3-6 (2005).
83 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 55-56.
84 Id. at 68.
85 Id. at 131. More than a thousand years later, the British East India Company would take the same tack. Id. at
350. Diamond is hence incorrect to suggest that laws “arise in opposition to the customary order of the
antecedent kin or kin-equivalent groups.” Diamond, supra note 69, at 54.
86 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 212-13.
80
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courts, and juridical bodies spread—but Pirie gives the impression that this tended to happen
slowly, over decades or centuries, rather than in one fell swoop.87
Roberts’s model of law “as associated with the state and its processes of government”
emerges only in the seventeenth century.88 And when the state did adopt its own law, rulers
often borrowed that law from an extrinsic, pre-existing source. Religious texts were not the only
potential objects of emulation. The Persian emperor Darius the Great, for example, cribbed
his code from Mesopotamian predecessors.89 The first European codes, which in time would
evolve into what is now called the civil law, drew in part on customary norms and processes,
and in part on pieces of Roman law preserved in Constantinople though Justinian’s
codification.90 Even when a discernibly modern state emerged, it did not extirpate parallel
‘legal’ systems. As the historian Dylan Penningroth has explained, slaves in the antebellum
South developed “complex networks of social relations” through which they could
transubstantiate “possessions into property.”91 Remarkably, under one of the most brutally
repressive and extractive regimes of the past several centuries, subordinated peoples have
developed and deployed the social technology of law—despite, if not against, the state.
Law, on Pirie’s view, can coexist alongside state institutions of adjudication and
coercion, and even float above them as an unrealized, immaterial aspiration. Its relation to
coercion, pace Weber, is contingent and not constitutive.92 The example of customary or
religious law folded into imperial enterprises shows how law can indeed be layered into the
state.93 The finding of law persisting in Tibet and Kabylia beyond the state’s writ further suggest
that law can cling to life in liminal zones geographically contiguous with, but standing in uneasy
détente with, the project of state-building.94 The afterlife of Roman law, at least as refracted
through Justinian’s Institutes, shows that law can also endure past the state that engendered it.
Rather than a tightly hitched relationship of necessity, the relation of law to the state is thus
open as a descriptive and as an analytic matter. There is hence at least a potential distinction,
moreover, between, between law and state power.95 The former may or may not be in service
of the latter.

Id. at 270-71 (describing the diffusion of “rules, practices, and principles developed within the royal system of
courts” across medieval England as occurring between the thirteenth and the sixteenth century).
88 Id. at 315; id. at 451 (“In little more than three hundred years, law has come to be associated firmly with the
nation-state’). There is a lively debate about when the “modern” state comes into being, and not all would agree
with Pirie that it is an Enlightenment creation. Cf. JOSEPH R. STREYER, ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE
MODERN STATE (2011).
89 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 32-33.
90 Id. at 319-20; id., at 150-51 (describing the origins of Lex Salica in “customs” and “practices”). In England the
common law similarly was not a “systematic body of precedent and rules.” Id. at 321.
91 DYLAN C. PENNINGROTH, THE CLAIMS OF KINFOLK: AFRICAN AMERICAN PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY IN
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 189 (2004).
92 Cf. PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 449 (“Daghestanti villagers, who did not have a police force or
prisons, wrote out rules to regulate the use of common property.”). For a nuanced view of the relationship
between force and law, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 10 (2015) (underscoring the importance
of “law’s coercive, force-imposing, and force-threatening dimensions”).
93 More generally, legal rules depend on the “working social context” in which they are found and depend on
the “semi-autonomous social fields on which they impinge.” Moore, supra note 53, at 742.
94 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 398-99 (describing Tibetan nomadic “tribes’ laws” despite their lack of
a state apparatus). On the persistence of law in Kabylia “despite a century of colonial rule,” see Judith Scheele, A
taste for law: rule-making in Kabylia (Algeria). 50 COMP. STUD. SOC. & HIST. 895, 900 (2008) (noting that “laws,
codes and rules remain omnipresent in Kabylia”).
95 PIRIE, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 12.
87

16
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4152350

Pirie’s separation of law and state opens analytic horizons, but is not without its
difficulties. For one thing, it has the virtue of dodging what Clifford Geertz called the
“misconception” that laws are “mere artifices, more or less cunning, more or less illusional,
designed to facilitate the prosier aspects of rule.”96 That is, laws cannot be reduced to the
practical projects of the powerful; indeed, they are often crutches on which the powerful lean
to compensate for their inability to be omnipotent. It allows for the possibility of what Robert
Cover famously called “jurigenesis,” or the emergence of distinct normative orders up in
isolated communities far from the chambers of official power.97 In addition, Pirie’s account also
avoids the potentially difficult question of determining who or what the state is.98 It critically
allows for the possibility of recognizing law despite the absence of a state-sanctioned author. It
also widens the array of potential functional justifications that might be offered for law’s
persistence. Where the state does not extend, such as among the Golok tribes of Tibet, and
where “detailed and explicit” sets of “printed laws” are not “applied directly,” they may still
invoked with “reverence” by adjudicators.99 Such laws are not instruments toward some
practical goal of the powerful. They instead inscribe a normative horizon, creating a “sense of
moral order … rooted in tribal autonomy ... morally linked to the legal and religious traditions
of central Tibet.”100 (Mutatis mutandi, one might ask whether much the same could not be said
about the U.S. constitution today, at least outside the clutches of the Justices). Yet at the same
time, a concern about definitional inflation—i.e., is the idea of law infinitely extensible? Where
does it end?—looms especially large once the idea of law is decoupled from the project of the
state.
This first element of Pirie’s account diverges fairly clearly from the conveyer belt model
of law. The origin of law, Pirie shows, is not accurately understood in terms of official acts by
duly authorized officials or citizens. Instead, the latter might come to recognize law not because
it has the correct source, but rather because it already claims widespread adherence or
sociological legitimacy. Law cannot be defined by the authoritative caliber of its sources. Quite
the contrary, as students of the common law and custom have long been telling us,101 law can
obtain despite the absence of a properly credentialed source.
B.

Law’s Systematicity and Casuistry

If shearing law from the state creates a problem of definitional inflation, then it is worth
asking what intellectual resources Pirie brings to bear in corralling the category of law back into
a manageable compass. No direct answer is offered in the text of The Rule of Laws, but one can
be inferred from its structure and details. This answer focuses on a set of formal qualities, in the
sense of qualities distinct from the substance of the rules experienced by regulated parties, and
methodological habits that are repeatedly found across otherwise divergent models of law.
Consonant with the polythetic nature of law in Pirie’s account, I offer no claim that every one
of the following can be found in each case of “law.” But the commonalities are recurrent
enough to make them highly symptomatic of that taxon.
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, NEGARA: THE THEATER STATE IN 19TH CENTURY BALI 122 (1980).
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983).
98 Consider in that regard the response offered by a pirate after his capture by Alexander the Great, as
recounted by St. Augustine: “What thou meanst by seizing the whole earth; but because I do so with a petty
ship, I am called the robber, whilst thou dost it with a great fleet are styled emperor.” ST. AUGUSTINE, THE
CITY OF GOD 112-13 (M. Doda, trans. 2010).
99 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 398-99.
100 Id. at 400.
101 Postema, Common Law, supra note 23, at 601; Duxbury, supra note 23, at 341 (making this point about custom
in legal positivist terms).
96
97

17
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4152350

Law thus is also a distinctive genre of intellectual system that is characterized by certain
distinctive styles of argumentation and related characteristics.102 It typically arises as a congeries
of rules, principles, and standards, not as a single commandment. None of the historical
examples that Pirie identifies involve a system comprising a single law. Nor is it easy to imagine
one. A plurality of commands instead characterizes any plausible legal system. This plurality
entails further a distinctive approach to resolving questions of application, in the sense that
different legal systems, widely separated in time and place, are characterized by the same kinds
of formal argumentative modes. Among the most important elements of this common toolkit
are: (i) the ambition toward abstraction, in the sense of categories being used that are
characterized by generality across time and space; coupled to (ii) a resistance to wholly
personalized, ad hoc, and situational judgments; (iii) the distinctive use of casuistic deduction
from general principles, and the related application of analogical reasoning; and finally, (iv) the
fact that the ensuing ‘system’ purports to have a durability over time, indexed by the
extraordinary efforts taken, even before the invention of paper, printing, or digital storage, to
reduce law to a written form with an extension in time and space. I hereafter use the term
‘systematicity’ to capture this distinctive blend of a durable103 plurality of norms with the
existence of common methodological tools for their application.104
It is worth saying that many of the elements I’ve pegged to law can also be observed in
other contexts. Law’s common features may overlap with nonlegal practices, even if there
remains a boundary line between what is and what is not law. Consider the durability,
generality, and formality of rules that define games such as chess and Go. Or think of the
famously “casuistic” reasoning of Jesuit scholars, ridiculed to great effect by Blaise Pascal.105
Indeed, the methods of (non-legal) casuistic reasoning can themselves be applied to legal
materials so as to reach judgments about law within the terms set by some other moral
systems.106 The existence of methodological overlap, and even the sharing of rules, between
law and extralegal intellectual systems does not, I think, defeat the ambition to delineate law as
a distinctive case. Two games, for example, might share some rules, but diverge in other ways
(think of Uno and its vastly inferior variant Dos). Law can borrow methods and moves from
other intellectual systems without losing its autonomy. Indeed, given the roots of much law in

Pirie uses the term “intellectual system” to describe law in other work. See Pirie, Law before Government, supra
note 32, at 222; PIRIE, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 73.
103 By “durable,” I also do not mean compositionally invariant. Like Theseus’s ship, the different pieces of a legal
system can be switched out one by one without losing a sense of identity over time. Pirie’s chapter on
colonialism, which I will not otherwise discuss in this review, leans into the history of European colonialism,
where it could have focused more on the way in which metropolitan ideas diffused into the legal systems of
subordinated societies. Compare PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 363 (briefing mentioning influence of
“English ideas of rights and liberty” on Indian nationalists), with Rabiat Akande, Secularizing Islam: The Colonial
Encounter and the Making of a British Islamic Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria, 1903–58, 38 L. & HIST. REV. 459 (2020)
(discussing how British imperial officials leveraged Sharia, and in so doing changed that legal system, in colonial
Nigeria).
104 In linguistics, that term has a related but distinct usage. Steven Phillips, Yuji Takeda, and Fumie Sugimoto,
Why Are There Failures of Systematicity? The Empirical Costs and Benefits of Inducing Universal Constructions, 7 FRONTIERS
IN PSYCH. 1, 1 (2016) (“Systematicity is a property of cognition where capacity for certain cognitive abilities
implies capacity for certain other (structurally related) cognitive abilities.”).
105 For Pascal’s famous critique of Jesuitical argumentation, see BLAISE PASCAL, THE PROVINCIAL LETTERS
194-212 (O.W. Wight ed., Thomas McCrie trans., Hurd and Houghton 1875) (Letter V).
106 For a fascinating example by a now-sitting Supreme Court Justice, see John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney,
Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 305 (1998) (“[W]e believe that Catholic judges (if they are
faithful to the teaching of their church) are morally precluded from enforcing the death penalty. This means that
they can neither themselves sentence criminals to death nor enforce jury recommendations of death.”)
102
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non-state practices, such as religion and custom, it is perhaps hardly surprising to observe
methodological bleed.
Evidence for this claim about law’s systematicity is scattered across The Rule of Laws. A
first indicia of law’s systematicity is the physical form that “law” takes: A durable writing.107
The very first law-givers in Mesopotamia “chiseled their laws onto stone slabs” with the aim of
endowing them with a “permanence” that could “outlast the authority of the lawmakers.108
The Dharmashastras were “read and reread, cop[ied], comment[ed] on, and collate[d],” even
as different kingdoms shuffled in and out of existence across the Indian subcontinent.109 Law
under the Zhou empire in what is now China was painstakingly etched on long bamboo strips,
each one character wide, for display to the general public.110 Several hundred years later,
magistrates of the Qin dynasty would use again similar bamboo strips to record specific
judgments, aggregating them into a system of precedent “not unlike the English common
law.”111 Around the time that Prince Vladimir of the Rurikids was fashioning the first Russian
laws from his capital in Kiev, issuing a first set of Russian laws in the Russkaia Pravda, the Rus
people were beginning to record their own customs and norms by writing down “instructions
and records” about their disputes on “peeling bark of birch trees.”112 While literacy was
becoming increasingly common among the Rus, it is striking that the practice of writing down
laws—sometimes with great public ceremony and often at great expense—dates back before
the wide diffusion of literacy.113 Written laws, that is, antedate the broad capacity of a public
targeted to consume such rules by reading them. Hence, even if publicity was a value advanced
by the reduction of “law” to a written form, it cannot have been the sole or even the most
pressing ambition of that costly enterprise early on. The rich examples that Pirie offers point to
something more at stake: Writing offered a “new modality” that bespeaks the ambition to
organize a society’s affairs at a more general level.114 It was an effort to forge a consciously
constructed system of verbal rules” using “abstract and objectively definable categories.”115 The
ambition to transcend not just the particulars of a specific case, but also the mundane
circumstances of a single law-maker or scribe toward some more durable kind of norm. Law,
that is, has long aimed past the sublunary particular toward the sub specie aeternitatis, even if it
never quite gets there.116
Of course, this raises the worry that Pirie’s examples are dominated by ones for which written records are
available. If that were indeed so, then it would be no surprise that law would be defined in the historical record
by its reduction to writing: That’s simply indexing what remains to us today. I am not convinced that this is a
serious worry. Pirie relies on not just her anthropological fieldwork, but also the time in the field of other
scholars, in societies where one might expect unwritten codes. Further, the colonial encounter produced records
(albeit highly imperfect ones) of the legal orders in societies subject to European expansion. See PIRIE, RULE OF
LAWS, supra note 30, at 352.
108 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 12.
109 Id. at 67
110 Id. at 76
111 Id. at 87.
112 Id. at 190-94
113 Id. at 101 (noting that the Twelve Tablets, containing laws in antique Rome, were “inscribed onto bronze
tablets and nailed up in the Forum,” even though “few citizens were literate”). For this point in the context of
law in medieval England and its environs, see Alice Taylor, Lex Scripta and the Problem of Enforcement: Anglo-Saxon,
Welsh, and Scottish Law Compared, in LEGALISM: COMMUNITY AND JUSTICE, supra note 49, at 48 (“Because written
law could be only the preserve of the literate and the specialist, it occupied a largely symbolic or ideological
position for the rest of the community.”).
114 JACK GOODY, THE LOGIC OF WRITING AND THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY 129 (1986).
115 PIRIE, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 138 (citation omitted); accord Fredric L. Cheyette, Suum
cuique tribuere, 6 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 287, 288 (1970) (offering a similar formulation).
116 In the extreme, the Emperor Justinian asserted that his codification of Roman law would be “valid for all
time.” PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 119. For a not altogether sympathetic account of this perspective,
107
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A second element of law’s aspiration toward transcendent generality can be found in
the verbal form that law takes. To see this, consider cases beyond the category of law. In the
Amdo region of Tibet, in what is now Quinghai province, mediators would negotiate between
parties to achieve a satisfactory resolution without applying any general norm. Their practice
was “not remotely legalistic.”117 It was not law, much as the informal norms famously identified
by Robert Ellickson in Shasta County were not law because there was no effort to systematize
the outcomes of discrete disputes into general rule-like regularities.118 So law may begin with
the traceries left by discrete resolutions,119 but in its core cases, the category of law bespeaks an
assembly of such decision points into something of more general scope and ambition. The law
cannot be for this case, and this case alone, lest it lose its claim to be “law” as such.
To be sure, no legal system can be perfectly abstract and general, or cover every
imaginable case. Even in a legal system that is mature in the sense of having endured for
decades, developing a thick underbrush of rules, questions of how much generality is needful
are likely to keep arising. In contemporary American law, those debates take several forms. In
an often-quoted essay, for example, Justice Scalia condemned the use of legal standards, as
opposed to sharp-edged rules, by intimating that they might not count as law at all.120 Further,
the question of law’s obligate generality has been sharply posed in the rare cases in which a
law-maker singles out a person or entity for distinctive treatment. This constitutional
jurisprudence, which treats the demands of Article III of the Constitution upon the adjudicative
branch, has been marked by a recent recession from the more exorbitant ambitions of
generality, albeit one that has occasioned sharp dissent and unfamiliar ideological cleavages.121
These disputes evince the continuing force of law’s modal claim to generality, as well as the
difficulty of applying that principle to specific circumstances. Yet it is telling that there is no one

see Thomas Nagel, The absurd, 68 J. PHILOSOPHY 716, 720 (1971) (“[H]umans have the special capacity to step
back and survey themselves, and the lives to which they are committed, with that detached amazement which
comes from watching an ant struggle up a heap of sand.”).
117 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 399.
118 ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 3, 283 (1991) (noting
that the ranchers and farmers in his study “develop[ed] and enforce[ed] adaptive norms of neighborliness that
trump formal legal entitlements” and hence that “some spheres of life seem to lie entirely beyond the shadow of
law”).
119 This seems to be the case in the Rurikind lands. PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 193-94.
120 Justice Scalia’s essay started out with an “image of how justice is done—one case at a time, taking into
account all the circumstances, and identifying within the context the “fair” result.” Scalia, supra note --, at 1176.
A judge who engages in an all-things-considered judgement is similarly “not so much pronouncing the law in the
normal sense as engaging in the less exalted function of fact finding.” Id. at 1180-81. This was not an abstract
commitment on Scalia’s part. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law As A Law of Law, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483, 488 (2014) (describing “numerous examples of Justice Scalia's rule-driven rather
than meaning-driven approach to decisionmaking”). Hence, generality, for Scalia, is almost necessary to law—a
stronger claim than I want to press here.
121 In Bank Markazi v. Petersen, the Court upheld provisions of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012 stating that the “financial assets that are identified in ... Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et
al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518,” 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(1)(C), (b), would be available “to satisfy any judgment ...
awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury or death caused by” acts of terrorism. Bank Markazi v.
Peterson, 578 U.S. --, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1322 (2016). The Court validated the law as consistent with the
“independent Judiciary” established by Article III, even though it altered the outcome of a pending case. Id.
Then, in Patchak v. Zinke, the Court upheld a statute that singled out and authorized a Department of the Interior
decision to take certain land into trust, and then directed the federal courts to dismiss all suits related to the land
in question. 138 S. Ct. 897, 910 (2018) (Thomas J., plurality op.). For further discussion of these cases, including
attention to their unfamiliar ideological divisions, see Aziz Z. Huq, Why Judicial Independence Fails, 115 NW. U. L.
REV. 1055, 1065-76 (2021).
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who suggests that a series of discrete, personalistic resolutions, lacking any sort of intellectual
glue, could ever count as “law.”
Related to systematically, and perhaps parasitic on it, the practice of law internally
entails a set of very similar analytic moves. It is thus characterized by what literary critics call a
style.122 This takes the form of distinctive patterns of normative reasoning. One of these is
casuistry, which is “the art of analyzing moral issues in terms of cases and circumstances.”123
The other is “analogical reasoning.” The latter has a number of “overlapping” features, which
include “principled consistency; a focus on particulars; incompletely theorized judgments; and
principles operating at a low or intermediate level of abstraction.”124 While analogical leaps
cannot be made in the absence of some principle determining similarities and differences, such
a principle need not be explicit, but it need be a “legal principle” to count here.125 Casuistry of
this ilk reflects and embodies law’s ambition toward systematicity.
Strikingly, these related methodological moves can be discerned at the very cusp of
Pirie’s history of law. The seed then planted has borne fruit many times across subsequent legal
systems. These borrowed habits of casuistic and analogical reasoning, indeed, shape the content
of law-school class discussions today. The earliest recorded laws, associated with the Sumerian
dynast Ur-Namma, were crafted in the casuistic form of “if … then.”126 One and a half
millennia later, the Athenian statesman Solon again adopted the casuistic form “almost
certainly inspired by Mesopotamian laws.”127 These stylistic indices of law “traveled westward,
along with luxury goods, decorative arts, and the alphabet.”128 The same style of reasoning was
once again “adopted and adapted by the citizens of Rome” a few hundred years later.129
Roman law, of course, influenced the European civil law and Anglo-American common law.
The latter eschewed “broad general principles,” and instead prized the “disciplined” practice
of argumentation: based on “analogical” reasoning , “arguing from one case to the next in
terms on the basis of perceived likenesses and differences … in the landscape of common
experience.”130 Today, it is no stretch to say that the form of casuistic reasoning from case-law
to hypotheticals, which is used in the 1L classroom around the United States, has a historical
For a useful definition of “style” in the art historical context, see MEYER SCHAPIRO, THEORY AND
PHILOSOPHY OF ART: STYLE , ARTIST , AND SOCIETY 51 (1994) (“[S]tyle is, above all, a system of forms with a
quality and a meaningful expression through which the personality of the artist and the broad outlook of the
group are visible”).
123 ALBERT R. JONSON AND STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL
REASONING 15 (1988) (also calling it the “case method); accord RICHARD MILLER, CASUISTRY AND MODERN
ETHICS: A POETICS OF PRACTICAL REASONING 4-5 (1996).
124 Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 746 (1993); see also Emily Sherwin, A Defense
of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1182 (1999) (defining analogic reasoning as follows:
“confronted with an unsettled question, the judge surveys past decisions, identifies ways in which these decisions
are similar to or different from each other and the question before her, and develops a principle that captures
the similarities and differences she considers important”). For a more parsimonious definition that I don’t follow
here, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 183-87 (1995) (defining analogical reasoning as a form of deduction
from rules). Sunstein also places more weight on the absence of “a comprehensive theory” driving outcomes
than I do. Sunstein, supra, at 747.
125 Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy, Expertise, and Experience, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 266
(2017).
126 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 17.
127 Id. at 35.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 44.
130 Postema, Common Law, supra note 23, at 6. In other ways, however, the common law was a divergence from
the modal form of law, in particular to the extent that it was “self-consciously nonsystematic.”
122
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pedigree far older than any other form of legal reasoning. Rather than working from text or
ordinary meaning, that is, reasoning from the facts of a precedent is the oldest modality of legal
reasoning.
I cannot substantiate the claim that law always involves casuistic or analogical reasoning.
But the diffusion of that kind of argumentative style has such a long historical pedigree. It has
widely spread thanks to the influence of first Mesopotamian law, and then Roman law. Now,
it seems to me reasonable to say that a distinctive, albeit not defining, element of law’s larger
systematicity is its highhanded claim to generality, abstraction, and durability over time.131
C.

Law’s Hieratic Elite

A third commonality flows from law’s systematicity. An intellectual system, like a
garden, must be cultivated and tended so as to expunge pests and to extend its vitality.
Accordingly, law tends to be associated with an intellectual elite that plays the role of gardeners,
a group that I label a hieratic elite because of their close connection in pre-modern (and perhaps
also our) societies with priesthoods. The members of this hieratic caste are responsible for
maintaining law’s systematicity in tolerably good working order. In preliterate societies, they
were also responsible for the bardic task of preserving and disseminating law across generations
through writing.132 In performing this function, however, the hieratic elite does not need to be
embedded in the state. To the contrary, it follows from Pirie’s dissociation of law and the state
that a hieratic legal elite can be entirely separate from state institutions.
Across time and vast geographic spans, hieratic elites have summoned a body of ideas
to facilitate law’s crystallization as an intellectual system. In antique Rome, “the authority of
the law” was closely associated with the classes of orators and jurists such as Cicero; their
authority in turn was tightly linked to the “independence of the law” as a system.133 In the wake
of the Roman destruction of the temple in Jerusalem, it was a group of rabbis who collected
“unwritten norms and ritual practices” and turned them into “a systematic program” with the
aspiration toward law.134 And after the fall of Rome, its legal traditions were kept alive by
scholars and Lombardian notaries, who continued to use ancient legal forms.135 Only with the
emergence of a law school at Bologna did a “powerful guild” of scholars emerge, pouring out
“commentaries, opinions, and glosses on the Corpus Iuris,” and hence establishing themselves
as “authorities on the law.”136 One of the ways in which China, at least since the Qin dynasty,
Pirie takes this claim a step further by asserting that “law” does not need to be effective in order to qualify as
law. See, e.g., PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 27 (noting that Hammurabi’s laws “do not ever seem to
have been referred to in legal cases”); id. at 151-52 (“[Justinian’s] Corpus Iuris made [little] impact on legal
practice at the time.”). Even if it is not applied, Pirie suggests, law can nonetheless supply a normative schematic
for society “specifying the different classes and professions people could belong to.” Id. at 27. I think one can
both accept that law has an aspirational cast and, perhaps, effect, and deny that the core case of law entails no
effect on actual social relations. All legal structures struggle to make an imprint on social world. See FROM
PARCHMENT TO PRACTICE: IMPLEMENTING NEW CONSTITUTIONS (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq eds., 2020)
(collecting case studies of struggles to realize new constitutional orders). So while it is implausible to demand
complete, or even near-complete compliance, to count something as law, it also seems plausible to say that its
“recurrent feature” is a tractable claim to viability as an actual guide to some segment of the social sphere.
132 Were there oral bardic traditions whereby laws were persevered? Cf. PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at
181 (noting the “oral wisdom of … poets and lawyers” in medieval Ireland)
133 Id. at 114-15.
134 Id. at 125.
135 Id. at 159.
136 Id. at 162; see also id. at 167 (flagging the role of scholars such as Ranulf de Glanville and Henry de Bracton in
formulating what would eventually become the common law of England).
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has been distinctive is its use of civil servants, rather than judges or scholars, to understand and
apply the law.137 Vedic scholars acted as judges, offered valuable legitimation for kings, and
“affirmed and elaborated” the emergent caste system.138
There are a number of reasons why law’s hieratic elite would emerge outside the state,
and then at times be subject to slow absorption into formal institutions. In the context of the
proto-states such as Mesopotamia and the Indus Valley, leaders could exercise authority
through physical force or by establishing the sociological legitimacy of their rule. Even today,
when the state has at its disposal a far wider array of tools for keeping the populace in line,
cultivating the belief that its rule is legitimate and warranted remains important.139 Violence is
rarely enough to constitute dominion.140 Putative leaders, of course, can claim legitimation on
the basis of outcomes.141 But if their position depends on the persistence of success alone, they
are rendered hostage to chance and fortune.142 Recourse to an external coterie of hieratic
intellectuals, who ostentatiously assert the autonomy of their systematic thought from politics’
vagaries, provides political leaders with a vehicle to credential their rule. If that coterie is
already ensconced within the state, it is less likely that it can credibly vouch for the legitimacy
of that state. The repeated emergence of a hieratic caste, often in communication with a leader
bent upon building a state, therefore, may hence be explained as one of the strategies for
consolidating and maintaining rule in the early stages of state-building.143 The relationship
between putative state-builders and hieratic elites, therefore, was likely one of symbiosis. Both
parties gained credibility and influence through their interaction. The hieratic caste could even
become “largely independent of any ruler’s political power.”144 Over time, moreover, those
leaders could integrate law “as a useful tool for building a bureaucratic state” and hence keeping
in line potential rivals.145
The exception to this trend is pre-Communist Chinese law. From the ancient Xia and
Shang dynasties, to the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1928, “emperors never allowed a class of
priests, or any other specialists, to challenge their authority.”146 Instead, “powerful emperors
managed to avoid the rule of law by . . . combin[ing] the roles of king and priest.”147 That is,
this period of Chinese development was marked not by an absence of a hieratic caste, but by a
substantial overlap—or perhaps identity—between that caste and the ruling class of powerId. at 81; id. at 245-49 (describing the operation of the legal bureaucracy in the Song period).
Id. at 61, 64-65 & 206.
139 I have in mind here a sociological understanding of legitimacy. See BRUCE GILLEY, THE RIGHT TO RULE:
HOW STATES WIN AND LOSE LEGITIMACY 6 (2009) (“Legitimacy … is a particular type of political support that
is grounded in common good or shared moral expectations.”). Moral legitimacy is “moral justifiability or
respect-worthiness.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1794-95
(2005).
140 Isaac Ariail Reed, Performative state-formation in the early American Republic, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 334, 335 (2019)
(“We can … expect all processes of state- formation to involve some aspect of performative display.”).
141 In the modern context, there is evidence that the quality of representation in a democracy, which is an
outcome, determines legitimacy judgments. See Bo Rothstein, Creating political legitimacy: Electoral democracy versus
quality of government, 53 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 311, 311-12 (2009).
142 This observation is quintessentially associated with NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 70 (Harvey C.
Mansfield trans., 2d ed. 1998) (1532) (“And so [the Prince] needs to have a spirit disposed to change as the winds
of fortune and variations of things command him ….).
143 Pirie does not precisely say this, but briefly states that law can “both legitimate and limit power.” PIRIE, RULE
OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 453
144 Id. at 206.
145 Id. at 318 (discussing the consolidation of political power in the sixteenth century Europe).
146 Id. at 71-72 (noting also that emperors thereby “successfully avoided becoming, themselves, subject to the rule
of law”).
147 Id. at 455
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holding officials. Pirie carefully explores how legalist and Confucian thought enabled this state
of affairs. The legalist tradition in Chinese thought understood law as an instrument of direct,
coercive state control.148 In contrast, the Confucian “orthodox doctrine of the state” drew a
sharp contrast between penal law on the one hand and “teaching and moral guidance” on the
other.149 Confucian thought, with its accent on self-cultivation, hierarchy, and the force of filial
bonds, placed emphasis on values rather than laws.150 Confucian opposition to the
promulgation of legal codes, however, was unavailing. Between the Chou dynasty (between
1027 and 221 B.C.E.) and the Qing code of 1740, Chinese rulers employed comprehensive
codes embodying “ethical norms of Confucianism.”151 These laws, nevertheless, “always
operated in a vertical direction from the state upon the individual, rather than on a horizontal
plane directly between two individuals.”152 The content of those codes, moreover, was
“overwhelmingly penal.”153 This has been described by one commentator as a “legalist triumph
but confucianization of law.”154
At a minimum, law across Chinese history diverges sharply in its institutional
foundations and its social effects from other kinds of law canvassed by Pirie. Nevertheless, this
important example does not defeat the claim that it is a “recurrent feature” of law to have a
hieratic elite located outside the state. Rather, the polythetic understanding of law urged by
Pirie allows us to recognize the Chou code and its successors as law, and at the same time isolate
features of that institution that diverge from the core cases observed elsewhere: This is, indeed,
one of its strengths as a taxonomical method. The Chinese cases, I would instead suggest, has
two useful implications for understanding the more general category of law. As a descriptive
matter, it shows how law can emerge even when the relevant hieratic elite is well integrated
into the state-building enterprise. As a more normative matter, the Chinese experience points
toward a possibility that law can be grafted onto the enterprise of state building in such a way
that it imposes no effectual constraint upon the exercise of state power. This possibility is wholly
consistent with law’s systematicity and its dependence a hieratic elite—but would have
implications for the normative valence of the category “law” more generally.
D.

Law’s Normativity

The first three features of law that I have picked out of Pirie’s synoptic account are
matters of descriptive fact. They reflect either the social or institutional contexts in which law
arises, or the formal content of law as a distinctive intellectual system. The fourth commonality
is again an empirical regularity, but one that operates in a subtly different register. This is the
idea that law is associated with the making of a normative claim. To say of a rule that it is one
element of a legal system, that is, is implicitly to make a claim that it has some normative force.
To be clear, this is true of rules in many contexts. The rules of chess or Go also have some
relationship to normativity, i.e., to an ‘ought’ as well as an ‘is.’ So what distinguishes them from
See Erik Lang Harris, Legalism: Introducing a Concept and Analyzing Aspects of Han Fei's Political Philosophy, 9 PHIL.
COMPASS 155 (2014). There was “bitter controversy between Confucians and Legalists from 536 BC[E]
onwards.” MENSKI, supra note 40, at 525.
149 GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 6-7 (1996).
150 Id. at 9-11 (noting a “preference for education rather than law as a means by which people should be
guided”); see also MENSKI, supra note 40, at 508 (“[P]unishment did have a place in the scheme of Confucian
ethics, but it was to be used sparingly and merely to support moral discipline”).
151 MENSKI, supra note 40, at 522-23.
152 Derk Bodde, Basic Concepts of Chinese Law: The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Thought in Traditional China, 107
PROC. AM., PHIL SOC. 375, 376 (1963).
153 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 92 (discussing the Tang code); Bodde, supra note --, at 375.
154 Bodde, supra note 152, at 386.
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law? It is a further element of Pirie’s argument, as I read it, that in almost every case, the law is
associated with a distinctive normative project that she calls the “rule of law.” As I read her,
this term connotes the constraint of powerful actors, often those affiliated to a state.
Consider first the idea that law is somehow normative in nature. The meaning of the
term ‘normativity’ is debated among philosophers and jurists. A useful general definition can
be borrowed from the philosopher Christine Korsgaard. On her Kantian account, normative
standards “do not merely describe a way in which we in fact regulate our conduct” but also
“make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide.”155 Normativity, on this
account, involves something more than description. It also purports to supply some or all of the
elements necessary for a person to have a reason for action or inaction. Normativity,
understood as some measure of prescription or reason-giving, does not require that the
audience to whom reasons are provided be universal. It is, for example, a normative claim that
I should not leave my children waiting in the rain after school, even though that claim does not
bear on anyone else. So too is it a normative claim that a knight or a rook can only make certain
moves on a chess board. Nor does this exceedingly thin account of normativity dictate much
about the nature or direction of the reasons supplied (if any indeed are).
Law, according to the account offered in The Rule of Laws, has a normative edge. To say
that something ‘is’ the law is to do more than describe a normatively inert empirical fact.156 But
the precise onus that this observation places upon human behavior can vary quite dramatically.
To point to law’s normativity is not to say all that much. It is not to say law has either a positive
social effect, or, more pessimistically, portends exploitation and the despoiling of the weak. It is
simply to say that the law connotes a normative claim of some sort in the same way, say, as a
chalkboard connotes a pedagogical or communicative ambition.157 The law, one might even
say with a hint of melodrama, is akin to a vaudevillian’s unctuous prestidigitation, fluttered out
to obscure the naturalist fallacy.158 Further, it is quite clear (albeit not quite said) from the reach
and detail of Pirie’s history that societies organized around diametrically divergent and
mutually repugnant moral claims can alike deploy the law as she defines it. Most polities have
used law in some way. And most have rested on economic or social arrangements that are
deeply repugnant to the early twenty-first American palate. Law can be found in polities that
were organized around slave labor, the colonial extraction of wealth from subjugated lands, or
the deliberate suppression and extermination of religious or racial minorities.159 Jurists under
the National Socialist regime, for instance, “emphatic[ally] call[ed] for merging law with
mortality” so that the state’s authority encompassed not only the sphere of outer freedom but
the also the sphere of inner freedom.”160 All this, remember, under law’s broad flag.
The variety of normative orders that can be embodied in law is illustrated by the vast
range of normative claims made by law throughout history. This variety is not easily reducible
CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 9 (1996); see also JUDITH J. THOMPSON,
NORMATIVITY 1 (2015) (offering a similar thought, albeit less crisply). Normativity is also connected to the
provision of reasons, which have been described as “the only fundamental elements of the normative domain.”
T.M. SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC ABOUT REASONS 3 (2014).
156 Cf. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 182 (1983) (“[L]aw … is part of a distinctive manner of
imaging the real.” (quotation marks omitted)).
157 No doubt there are non-communicative uses of a chalkboard—torture for the aurally sensitive, perhaps?—
but they are deviant and marginal uses, far removed from the central meaning of the term.
158 This is in sharp contrast to Hans Kelsen’s resistance to deriving legal validity from historical facts. HANS
KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-205 (Max Knight, trans. 1967).
159 A point made emphatically in HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 200.
160 HERLINDE PAUER-STUDE, JUSTIFYING INJUSTICE: LEGAL THEORY IN NAZI GERMANY 211 (2020).
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to a simple classification.161 Instead, the best way to perceive law’s diverse normativity is
through the range of examples on offer.
Start with law beyond the state: Roughly twelve or thirteen centuries ago, Tibetan
nomads developed a complex system for injury compensation built upon an intricate “logic of
… status distinctions.”162 Doubting that Tibetan society of the time could be quite so finely
sliced, Pirie suggests, this premodern Tibetan law offered a “map for civilization,” and not a
map of an existing social order.”163 Similarly, the ‘law codes’ of Mesopotamia, including
Hammurabi’s, are “best understood” not as “repositories of law” but rather as the “rhetorical
expressions” of “duties and limitations of royal power.”164 Four millennia later, the first Holy
Roman Emperor Charlemagne ordered the re-promulgation of the older Lex Salica, but failed
to update that text in line with inflation: The result was a law that could scarcely be applied “in
any detail,” and yet expressed his aspiration toward “something grander”—a regime akin to
that of the glorious earlier Roman emperors.165 Writing of law in medieval Anglo-Saxon
kingdoms, Alice Taylor affirms that “written codes projected, rather than actually governed, a
united legal community,” and as such had a “symbolic value” that quickly outran the writ of
marshbound monarchs.166 Only in the thirteenth century, suggests Frederick Cheyette, did
people take the fateful step of “equat[ing] the norms used to make authoritative settlements
with the norms that are supposed to govern men's [sic] behavior.”167 In contrast, hundreds of
years before that, Hindu scholars drew on Manu’s Dharmashastra to affirmatively produce a
phenomenal and palpable “hierarchy of social status that put brahmins and ruling classes above
commoners and servants.”168 Law here served as a map for the active creation of a social order.169
It suggests that law can enable people to experience a sense that they are “participating in a
wider cosmological order.”170 And then in her fine anthropological work on modern Tibet,
Pirie has explored how law can be a site of compromise in contests between an imperial power
and a subaltern people.171 Rather than being a vessel for casting the molten metal of contempt
into the permanent irons of hierarchy, law is a median in which the colonial master and their
subaltern meet, clash, and find a murky, negotiated ground.

In a fleeting comment in the book’s conclusion, Pirie offers a tripartite taxonomy of law’s normativity:
“justice in Mesopotamia, discipline in China, and duty in India.” PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 448,
541-43. None of the key terms she uses of justice, discipline, and duty, however, is illuminating: Each of those
terms could be glossed in very different ways.
162 Id. at 8.
163 Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted); id. at 449 (“At their most basic level, laws provide a means to order social life.”).
164 DAVID WENGROW, WHAT MAKES CIVILIZATION? 129 (2010); see also NORMAN YAFFE, MYTHS OF THE
ARCHAIC STATE: EVOLUTION OF THE EARLIEST CITIES, STATES, AND CIVILIZATIONS 108 (2005) (describing
Hammurabi’s law code as an “attempt to portray Babylonian domination of conquered territory as
quintessentially just).
165 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 153-54; id. at 450.
166 Taylor, supra note 113, at 48. I say ‘marshbound’ because at the periphery of royal power, Welsh law existed
“in an ambiguous relationship to royal power.” Id. at 71; see also ALICIA MARCHANT, THE REVOLT OF OWAIN
GLYNDWR IN MEDIEVAL ENGLISH CHRONICLES 14-15(2014) (summarizing the major revolt against English
rule led by the famous Owain Glyndwr).
167 Cheyette, supra note 115, at 278.
168 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 206.
169 See PIRIE, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 222 (“[L]aws and codes make explicit an ideal of justice
in the form of concepts and principles fundamental to the social organization of their time and place.”).
170 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 311.
171 Fernanda Pirie, The limits of the state: Coercion and consent in Chinese Tibet, 72 J. ASIAN STUD. 69, 80-85 (2013)
(exploring “complex, shifting, and negotiated” links between state and society).
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All these are, to put it mildly, widely divergent kinds of normativity.172 In each case, the
law is being deployed in the service of a certain species of social order. Sometimes, it is purely
aspirational; sometimes it’s a bare palimpsest, lying lightly on the face of experience; and
sometimes it forms a heavy set of chains, keeping the lowly in their fixed and earthbound place.
Yet across these cases, the relation between the law and that social order is not fixed: Law can
be a blueprint, an arena for conflict and compromise, or a myth of sorts. One possible inference
from Pirie’s history hence concerns the changing scope of law’s normativity. The normativity
associated with (say) chess or even parenting has a limited scope: It applies only to a certain,
limited set of activities. In contrast, Pirie’s narrative seems to capture a process of enlargement.
Law comes to apply to more and more facets of social life. If offers fewer and fewer exit options.
At the limit, it tenders a “whole cosmological order” from which there is no escape. At some
point in this series of developments, those subject of law seem to lose any choice as to whether
they are bound by law. At some point, that is, law applies regardless of subjective
intentionality.173
Pirie’s extensive evidence of law’s normativity in the thin sense, is persuasive: In its core
cases, law has normative aspirations. Gesturing either weakly or strongly to the way a society
‘should’ be ordered, law comes to operate as a source of reasons for action or hesitancy. The
law therefore does not take the proverbial “bad man,” who “cares only for the material
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict,”174 as its modal subject. Instead,
law operates in the main on the assumption that its subjects are social creatures,175 and as such
respond to reason-giving practices predicated on their being already embedded in a society.
Indeed, I wonder here if it is not too much to suggest that this species of normativity as
linked to sociality is not just a “recurrent feature” of law, but a feature that is never lacking.
This supposition is hard to prove or reject, although it certainly seems the case with respect to
contemporary societies characterized by legal regulation. This possibility has implications for
the modeling of individual incentives under such regulation. It is common for legal scholars,
especially those working in the rational choice tradition, to reject out of hand motivations that
cannot be modeled parsimoniously in terms of discrete, individual agents.176 For those who
embrace such models, the idea of law’s pervasive and thoroughly social normativity will seem
unpersuasive or irrelevant. For those already disposed to see human interactions as imbricated
in normativity, a stronger version of Pirie’s claim may well seem plausible.
There is also a second strand to Pire’s claim about normativity: She further claims that
laws have also “defined and limited how power should be exercised” across diverse historical

Accord PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 447 (noting the variance in “social ambitions” of law across
different historical contexts).
173 It is at this point that conflicts between the obligations imposed by law and those engendered by morality
become acute: No wonder, then, that the story of Antigone lies at the threshold of the Western theatrical, and
moral, tradition.
174 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
175 In contrast, the Holmesian ‘bad man’ is atomized and detached from any social context. See Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1773 (1976) (“The certainty of
individualism is perfectly embodied in the calculations of Holmes ' ‘bad man,’ who is concerned with law only as
a means or an obstacle to the accomplishment of his antisocial ends.”).
176 There is some empirical evidence of the model’s limited accuracy. See Toshio Yamagishi et al., In search of
Homo economicus, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 1699, 1699-1700 (2014) (finding limited evidence of narrowly-defined utility
maximization behavior in a Japanese sample). And the model itself has been subject to considerable criticism
from different fronts. For a recent summary, see Dante A. Urbina and Alberto Ruiz‐Villaverde, A critical review of
homo economicus from five approaches, 78 AM J. ECON. & SOC. 63 (2019).
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and institutional contexts, and as such produced “the rule of law.”177 This is a more ambitious
claim than her first. It posits not only that law is associated with some sort of normative claim,
but rather that it generates a very specific kind of normative effect: that law forges “limit[s]” on
how “power” (however this term defined) is wielded. Law, that is, is said to serve the specific
good of curbing the potential for the misuse of power.
I am not sure that Pirie has substantiated this more ambitious and important assertion
about the relationship between law and legality. But I will take up this worry in the next Part,
by exploring how the account of law I’ve derived from The Rule of Laws interacts with the famous
argument for legality as a conceptual prerequisite to law offered by Lon Fuller.178
E.

The Conveyer Belt Model of Law Reconsidered

Let’s return then to the conveyer-belt model of law which, I asserted, lies behind
contemporary claim-making about law and the rule of law. Recall that this model has three
elements in my telling: that the law has a temporally distinct origin in an officially authorized
source; that its application must be channeled through a cadre of specialized state actors
(typically judges); and that their application of law to fact yields generalized social goods.
Like a sudden cold breeze in autumn, Pirie’s work has the salutary and bracing effect
of showing that no piece of this model holds true; Its lurid blossoms, promising so much on
law’s behalf, wither and shrivel. To begin with, law does not necessarily originate via any
officially authorized channel. To the contrary, it is not merely the law merchant that has
percolated into formal legal codes from beyond the state.179 At its inception, law is often
substantively parasitic on exogenous custom or religious norms. These are worked up and
maintained by a hieratic elite, again often located outside the state. The consequent vectors of
law’s influence upon social practice are varied—law works as aspiration or intellectual vanity
as often as it offers practical guidance—and they do not always involve the state and its agents.
Finally, law may make normative claims on its subjects—but we have yet to discern whether
this yields the general good of legality implicit in the conveyer belt model.
The conveyer-belt model of law that imagines a unidirectional trajectory from text to
application to legality, in short, makes nice copy. Pirie’s work suggests, however, that it has little
to do with the social facts of law as observed transhistorically. We need, instead, a more
complex account of law, one that decenters the state and that takes account of the many
different ways in which law can be invoked by both officials and also the public.
III.

Law as Polythetic Category in Theory

The polythetic conception of law made available in The Rule of Laws provides a powerful
lens through which to reconsider theoretical claims about law, and to analyze some of the
pressing contemporary challenges to the rule of law. In this Part, I aim to show how the account
of law developed in Parts I and II provides a fruitful starting point for theorizing about law and
its benefits. Specifically, I now put aside the demotic conveyer-belt model as refuted. Instead, I
will develop implications from the polythetic conception for some features of canonical works
PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 311.
See infra Part III.B.
179 The role of commercial practice has long been recognized and embraced. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The
First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873, 903-04 (1939) (offering a “plea for merchants' law to be
recognized and be further made for merchants”).
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of H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller. The former brings into sharp focus the distinction analytic
contribution of the polythetic definition, and also helps us think about the relation of law to the
state; the latter points our analysis toward a reconsideration of law’s linkage to the rule of law.
A.

History and officialdom in The Concept of Law

Perhaps the most influential work of twentieth-century Anglophone jurisprudence is
H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law.180 Hart’s immensely rich work has been foundational
respecting many important questions; its influence continues to be felt in mainstream public
law discussions in the United States.181 Most importantly, Hart opens his work by
characterizing it as a piece of “descriptive sociology”182; he relatedly offers an account of the
movement from a “primitive” to a “developed” legal system.”183 He goes on to famously argue
that “[t]he union of primary and secondary rules is at the center of a legal system,” even if it is
“not the whole” of that system.184
I want to focus here on two elements of Hart’s account in respect to which Pirie’s
evidence fruitfully bears. The first is the role of history, or genealogy, in The Concept of Law, and
the second is the role that “officials,” and hence the state, play in the recognition and
application of law. On both points, there is not a settled, single understanding in the voluminous
literature on The Concept of Law. Even the seemingly anodyne opening genuflection toward
“descriptive sociology,” indeed, remains an object of lively debate.185 So I will do my best to
make clear how I understand Hart, and upon whose readings I rely.
1.

The Movement from the Primitive to the Modern in The Concept of Law

Hart’s Concept of Law begins by rejecting John Austin’s command theory of the law to
make space for a “fresh start.”186 His ostensible aim is to make room for an “modern municipal
legal system.”187 Hart begins this new account of law by offering the reader a generalized
historical narrative—a genealogy—of how law comes into being. Hart’s genealogy posits two
states of social development. Movement from the first to the second marks a transition from
the “pre-legal to the legal world.”188 The first stage is a “primitive” society, lacking a “system”

HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22.
In a 1979 essay, Hart identifies three “central” theses of posivitism: the conceptual separation of law and
morals; the social sources of law; and the thesis of judicial discretion. H.L.A. Hart, The New Challenge to Legal
Positivism, 36 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 460-63 (2016). I address the first below, in reference to Fuller’s
claim about legalism, and indirectly address the second, here. I have nothing to say here on the third.
182 HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at iv.
183 Id. at 91-95.
184 Id. at 99.
185 For competing interpretations, see Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909,
1911-12 (2004) (noting that Hart’s method involved the “use of the implicitly empirical methods of ordinary
language philosophy” and that “Hart's claims about the central features of a legal system are driven as much by
the observations of an insider to the system as by philosophical speculation”), and Ronald Dworkin, Thirty Years
On, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1680 (2002) (“What kind of sociology is conceptual? What kind makes no use of
empirical evidence? What kind defines itself as studying not just legal practices and institutions here and there,
but the very concept of law everywhere”). In her monograph, Pirie describes Hart’s method as entailing the
“description of usage [as] the foundation for the foundation for philosophical analysis.” PIRIE, ANTHROPOLOGY
OF LAW, supra note 32, at 17.
186 HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 80.
187 Id. at 239-40. Hart distinguishes this from a “primitive” system, but does not provide a clear distinction
between these categories. Id. at 3.
188 Id. at 94.
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of laws, but instead striated by “primary rules of obligation.”189 This society, however,
experiences “defect[s]” of uncertainty, immobility, and inefficiency that “require
supplementation.”190 To remedy these “defects,” “secondary” rules of recognition, change, and
adjudication emerge, which are used by “officials” to isolate, adjust, and apply primary rule.191
It is the “union of primary rules of obligation with such secondary rules” that “characterize[es]”
law.192 This account has a teleological flavor. Most obviously, it seems to posit the “primitive”
as an antecedent stage to the modern. The former is “simple” and lacks “specifically legal
concepts with which the lawyer is concerned.”193 At the same time, defects in the primitive
system seem to be causally prior to the complex of secondary rules necessary for law to emerge.
Hart does not explicitly suggest that without the first primitive stage, the second modern one
cannot emerge: but it is not hard to extract that implication from his text. This suggests that
law, as such, emerges only when the state reaches a certain threshold of complicity—a
suggestion that is at odds with the non-state-centered polythetic definition of law.
The first question that I want to take up is what we should make of this story, and
whether it is indeed inconsistent with the polythetic definition outlined in Part II. There is some
disagreement about the story’s role in Hart’s argument. John Gardner brusquely consigns
Hart’s account to an oubliette for “fables,” labeling it “an imaginary tale of the birth of a
possible legal system.”194 On this view, Hart’s argument simply has nothing to do with how
“how actual legal systems in general emerge, or even whether one legal system ever has so
emerged.”195 Nicola Lacey also suggests that Hart was not very concerned with the
correspondence between his argument and empirics.196 In a slightly different register, Leslie
Green reads Hart’s theory as “plac[ing] law firmly in history.”197 He adds that the existence of
law “follows wholly from the development of human society, a development that is intelligible
to us, and the content of particular legal systems is a consequence of what people in history
have said and done.”198 But even he dismisses Hart’s threshold account as “wooden” and
“fictional.”199
On the other hand, at least one recent commentator reads Hart to be offering an
abstraction closely calibrated to historical facts, and hence amenable to evaluation on the basis
of an understanding of such empirics. Coel Kirby suggests that Hart relies on “fundamental

Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 92-93.
191 Id. at 94-97 & 117.
192 Id. at 94. The “existence of a legal system,” though, depends on two further facts: that primary rules are
“generally obeyed,” and secondary rules are “effectively accepted as common public standards of official
behavior by … officials.” Id. at 116; id. at 117 (noting that only officials need to accept law from the “internal
point of view”).
193 Id. at 93, 98
194 John Gardner, Why law might emerge: Hart’s problematic fable, in READING HLA HART’S THE CONCEPT OF LAW
81, 82 (L. Duarte et al. eds. 2013).
195 Id. A similar reading is offered by Philip Pettit, who describes Hart as engaged in a “counterfactual exercise”
that “should be distinguished from the genealogy in a historical sense.” Philip Pettit, Social Norms and the Internal
Point of View: An Elaboration of Hart’s Genealogy of Law, 39 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 231 (2019).
196 Nicola Lacey, Analytical jurisprudence versus descriptive sociology revisited, 84 TEX. L. REV. 944, 953 (2005) (“Hart
was relatively impervious to historical and sociological criticism, precisely because he saw his project as
philosophical and therefore to the charge of having ignored issues that seemed central to historians and social
scientists.”).
197 Leslie Green, The Concept of Law Revisited, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1687, 1691 (1996).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 1698.
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social data … for analytic generalizations.”200 On this view, Hart’s key distinction between
primary and secondary is “drawn from a generalised description of empirical knowledge of
‘primitive’ societies derived primarily from anthropological sources [and] driven by the
dynamics of social evolutionary.”201 Further, Kirby argues, the “step from the pre-legal world
into the legal world is … an evolution of primitive societies bound by custom into modern
societies of individuals mediated by law.”202 There is some textual evidence, contends Kirby,
to support this reading. Hart does point to the “many studies of primitive communities.”203 He
also refers to “rules … always found in primitive societies of which we have knowledge,” to
“what is confirmed by what we know of primitive communities,” and to the “history of law.”204
The relevant pages in The Concept of Law are supported in end notes with citations to
anthropological studies, rather than philosophical work positing a state of nature.205 On the
other side of the ledger, Hart begins his account by asking readers to “imagine” a society
without legal institutions.206
Another possibility—somewhat in between the polar opposite readings offered by
Gardner and Kirby—is the idea of genealogy as functional explanation. In a masterful late
work, Bernard Williams has explained the use of genealogy as a “narrative that tries to explain
a cultural phenomenon by describing a way in which it came about, or could have come about,
or might be imagined to have come about” in a fashion that always “will consist of real history,”
at least in part.207 On Williams’s account, a genealogy can be fictional in the sense that it
abstracts away from the particulars of a specific historical trajectory, yet nonetheless
explanatory because it “represents as functional a concept, reason, motivation, or other aspect
of human behavior, where that item was perhaps not previously seen as functional.”208
Understood in this sense, a genealogy derives a generalization from plural and complex
histories as a way of accentuating the “functional,” even as it sacrifices particulars and variances
of specific historical paths. Importantly, while a genealogy in this sense has some relation to
historical facts, it can be calibrated at either more or less distant from them.
Can Pirie’s history help us to evaluate whether the very idea of a transition from
primitive to modern societies produces the law as a historical matter? I think so—and asking
the question usefully brings into focus how the polythetic definition of law is both novel and
distinctive. The evidence marshalled by Pirie suggests that such a sequence does not track law’s
modal historical path. This offers an additional grounds for reading Hart in the way that
Gardner, Lacey, and Green do: To the extent that Kirby is correct, and the story of a
movement from primitive to modern law is taken literally, it makes little historical sense.
Indeed, even in the more modest sense offered by Williams, a genealogy of law can do scant
work. There are three reasons for this.

Coel Kirby, Law Evolves: The Uses of Primitive Law in Anglo-American Concepts of Modern Law, 1861-1961, 58 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 535, 536 (2018).
201 Id. at 556.
202 Id. at 557 (citation and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).
203 HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 91.
204 Id. at 91-93.
205 HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 291-92
206 Id. at 91.
207 BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS: AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY 20 (2002).
208 Id. at 34. There is a second, more critical, sense of the term that does not apply here, which involves a more
closer-to-the-grain reading of historical pathways. See Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in LANGUAGE,
COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS (D. F. Bouchard., ed. 1977). I don’t think
Hart is using ‘genealogy’ in Foucault’s sense, and so leave the latter to one side.
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First, Pirie’s evidence shows that law tends to emerge outside state institutions and prior
even to the coordinated efforts at formal rule-making that warrant the label of proto-state.209
In Europe, for example, “customs” and “practices” were borrowed and cast into written form
by soi-disant kings and emperors.210 Law was not necessarily a functional form associated with
the state’s drive toward more complex, more dynamic government. It instead was an off-therack solution to the practical problems associated with rule that emerge in the context of the
Mesopotamian Bronze Age and persist, mutatis mutandi, in the global market of digital goods
and services covered by UNCITRAL.211 The distinctive qualities of this intellectual system,
such as its reliance on analogic and casuistic modes of reasoning,212 do not arise because “a
simple form of social control will prove defective and will require supplementation.”213 Rather,
they are associated with the effort of a hieratic elite to refine an intellectual system comprised
of abstract, general categories.
Second, “authoritative” written embodiments of law are not necessarily a functional
response to the problem of “uncertainty.”214 From Hammurabi onward, laws have been
reduced to writing even when they do not ever seem to have been referred to in legal cases,”215
or even capable of being read (and hence understood) by their putative subjects. Even the
Justinian “Corpus Iuris made [little] impact on legal practice at the time.”216 Neither of these
examples of codification seem to be historical outliers. Yet neither was adopted in response to
a functional need for a focal point to facilitate coordination and compliance in the face of
“uncertainty.”217 Again, this is inconsistent with the idea of an evolution from primitive to
modern societies driven by functional forces.
Third, as Jeremy Waldron has observed, it is “wrong to think that secondary rules are
the only ways of remedying defects … in a simple society of primary rules.”218 Pirie’s historical
work abrades Waldron’s concern into a sharper point. The “defects” Hart associates with
primitive legal systems can well be solved by the expedient of identifying a hieratic caste. The
latter do not develop any formal criteria of validity, whether embodied in writing or not. The
‘rule of recognition’ might simply be what the caste declares to be legally valid. As a result,
there is no functional necessity for any non-compositional rules of recognition, change, or
adjudication—i.e., verbal rules that are independent of, and supplementary to, the social fact

See supra text accompanying notes 81 to 90.
PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 150-51 (describing the origins of Lex Salica)
211 Id. at 431-32.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 102 and 104.
213 HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 92.
214 Id. at 94-95. Note that my point here is about the plausibility of a genealogical account: I am not making a
point about the relative plausibility of exclusive versus inclusive legal positivism. For brief definitions, see Wilfrid
J. Waluchow, The many faces of legal positivism, 48 U. Toronto L. J. 387, 394-95 (1998).
215 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 27.
216 Id. at 151-52
217 More generally, there is some reason to worry about functionalist explanations for social phenomena. In
perhaps the famous and most influential genealogy, Nietzsche noted that “[t]he standpoint of utility is as alien
and as inapplicable as it could possibly be” when it comes to explaining the origins of moral concepts.
FREDERICK NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 15 (M.C. Scarpitti trans., 2013); see also Robert W.
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 64 (1984) (developing a critique of the view that “the legal
system has in fact responded to evolving social needs”). If functionalist explanations generally do not illuminate
the causes or shapes of social phenomena such as law (or its constituent elements), there is an open question of
what the genealogy of the kind Hart offers can illuminate.
218 Jeremy Waldron, All We Like Sheep, 12 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 169, 173 (1999) [hereinafter
“Waldron, All We Like Sheep”].
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of a hieratic group’s composition.219 Provided the group is socially homogenous enough,
defined by sufficiently convergent interests, they may never need to formulate, or even imagine,
rules of change, adjudication, or recognition. Cicero, for example, underscored “the
importance of the jurists” as “interpreters of law” capable of asserting “the authority of law.”220
Islamic law was initially “unsystematic” and “not at all comprehensive,” but nevertheless
worked in practice because the Umayyad and Abbasid empires relied on uluma and qazis to
formulate working rules derived from both religious principles and local “norms and
practices.”221 To enable the settlement, application, and change of legal rules, in short, it may
not be necessary to have free-standing rules of recognition, adjudication, and change. There
hence need not be “internal” rule-following at work among officials, and no sincere criticism
for deviations.222 It may instead suffice to have a hieratic class that can, by fiat, declare what
the law is today, how it resolves particular cases, and what the law will be, perhaps differently,
tomorrow.223
To the extent that there is ambiguity in The Concept of Law, therefore, Pirie’s evidence
supplies powerful reasons for rejecting Kirby’s reading of the passage from primitive to modern
legal regimes. Even a more modest reading of that passage, as a genealogy in Williams’s sense,
runs into obstacles. Gardner’s description of the “fable” as “problematic” seems more apt as a
way of doing justice to Hart’s text without running into conflict with the empirical evidence.
2.

The Role of Officials in The Concept of Law

A second implication of Pirie’s historical evidence for Hart’s theory concerns the role of
“officials” in a modern legal system. On Hart’s view, a modern legal system exists where there
is a union of primary and secondary rules, and where one of the secondary rules, the rule of
recognition, sets out the criteria of legal validity for all other rules:224 The rule of recognition,
further, “provides the criteria by which the validity of other rules of the system” can be assessed,
including unwritten custom.225 It is hence a matter of official practice, i.e., the criteria officials
converge upon and accept from an internal point of view. Hart describes the relevant “official
world” as encompassing “the judiciary” and the “the legislature” and other tribunals

Or, to rework the Hartian account, the rule of recognition may be defined simply by whatever the hieratic
elite happens to say it is at a given moment in time. As I read Hart, this seems at minimum an outlier form of
law as he accounts for it.
220 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 114-15.
221 Id. at 131-32. The bulk of religiously derived rules in Islam are not anchored in the Qur’an, but in the hadith,
or authenticated sayings of the prophet. The ulema did develop something akin to a formal rule of recognition
for the purpose of authenticating hadith. Wael B. Hallaq, The Authenticity of Prophetic Ḥadîth: A Pseudo-Problem, 89
STUDIA ISLAMICA 75, 78-81(1999) (summarizing basic rules for recognizing hadith). Note that without the
emergence of recognized groups of scholars capable of formulating such a rule, the latter could not have
emerged.
222 HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 55-57.
223 If I were to dub this theory with a sarcastic label, I would call it the conspiracy theory of the law.
224 HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 99.
225 Id. at 103; id. at 94 (explaining that the rule of recognition “will specify some feature or features possession of
which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a [law]”); id. at 46 (discussing
custom).
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established by the state.226 And he distinguishes officials from “private citizens.”227 Hence, the
word “official” in Hart’s text seems to capture only state actors. Some commentators, such as
Roger Cotterrell, have disagreed and suggested that “priests” or “elders” could count.228
Cotterrell’s suggestion is, in my view, ultimately a fruitful one, but it is not supported by a
reading of Hart’s text.229 Hart, to be sure, recognizes that “only officials might accept and use
the system’s criteria of legal validity,” at the peril of a “deplorably sheeplike” public.230 But he
did not say that “officials” could be non-state actors.
Pirie’s historical account suggests not only a contingent relation of law and the state,
but also the strong historical likelihood that it is not state officials but a hieratic elite standing at
a remove from the state that fabricates and maintains law as an intellectual system.231 These elites
are drawn into symbiotic relations with the state, without always being absorbed into it. This
raises the interesting possibility the rule of recognition would comprise simply whatever rules
that this group of non-state actors happen to converge upon and accept regardless of pedigree
or logic.
Indeed, it is worth noting that Pirie’s account invites the thought that there may be
functional reasons for reliance on non-state actors to play this role. If law is to play the
legitimating role that the powerful seek, then the availability of a hieratic elite that is distinct
from the state may well make law more, rather than less, potent. Hence, law in its modern form
may be just as likely (or even more likely) to emerge when there is a non-state elite that can
operate as a site for the rule of recognition. Simultaneously, the gap between hieratic and
political elites enlarges the possibility, recognized by Hart,232 that law will be used to advance
the former’s social projects without regard to its costs to rulers or to other elements of the polity.
The promotion of the caste system by Brahminic scholars aimed at consolidating and
enhancing their own social standing illustrates this possibility.233 Law there provided a device
to maintain social hierarchy favoring a specific elite, notwithstanding the tide of shifting social
and political conditions.234

Id. at 122; see also Green, supra note 197, at 1693 (describing the rule of recognition as a “social rule[]” and a
“customary practice of those whose role it is to identify and apply primary rules.”). There must be a “common
practice … among officials” but this does not mean that such practice “form[s]s part of the reasons which each
of the officials has for accepting the rule of recognition.” Julie Dickson, Is the Rule of Reason Really A Conventional
Rule?, 27 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 373, 375, 381 (2007). At one instance, Hart briefly mentions an “umpire or
scorer” as a kind of official. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 102. Clearly, these are not state officials,
but I think Hart is best read in this passage as offering a non-state analogy to illuminate understanding of how a
legal system works.
227 HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 116.
228 ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 17 (2017).
229 The textual evidence on this point largely runs in one direction. In Chapter 10, Hart discusses international
law, but neither of the two “objections” he analyzes illuminates the question whether non-state officials can be,
or were at his time, the relevant social group among whom the rule of recognition was held and applied. Id. at
213-27. I take all these to be suggest that “officials,” especially in the core case of municipal law are within the
state. Accord Barber, The Rechtsstaat, supra note 62, at 450-51 (associating Hart with a “unitary model” organized
around the state).
230 Id. at 109 & 117 (noting how there is an “essentially factual” question of “practice” that lies behind
“statements of validity”).
231 See supra text accompanying notes 133 to 145.
232 HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 109 & 117.
233 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 206.
234 See S. BAYLY, CASTE, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN INDIA 25-26 (2001) (noting the fluid nature of Indian caste,
and identifying the 1650-1850 period as pivotal to its formation).
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This modest amendment to Hart’s account has interesting implications for the
American legal system. A traditional application of Hart’s rule of recognition in the United
States focuses on what counts as the validly enacted content of the U.S. Constitution, which
operates as supreme law within the jurisdiction.235 Of course, even a passing familiarity with
constitutional jurisprudence reveals that what counts as (supreme) constitutional law is not
determined by any stable criterion of validity: Neither text nor original public meaning, nor
even any blend of them with precedent, provides a plausible account of the supreme law’s
content. Justices instead cycle between text, original meaning, precedent, and first-order moral
reasoning. In this process of argumentative cycling, moreover, it is plausible to think that a
majority of those jurists are in practice responsive in a fairly direct and mechanical way to
ideological appeals by co-partisans that are cloaked in the appropriate ‘constitutional’ garb.236
This can be true, strictly, even if it is not possible to argue to a judge that ‘the law is simply what
you say it should be.’ The forms of legible argumentation within a legal system, that is, have no
necessary relationship to the underlying political economy of constitutional jurisprudence. The
paraphernalia of legal argumentation is hence no reliable index of the actual causal, motivating,
or binding quality of legal arguments. The United States’ rule of recognition, on this view,
depends not just on a hieratic elite of judges, but also on the parastatal organs that influence
successfully the Justices’ beliefs about what counts or does not count as law. As a result, a revised
account of the rule of recognition opens up the possibility that we are not just ruled by a Court
acting as a de facto “super-legislature,”237 but by the tight-knit group of intellectuals and
interest-groups that can persuade those judges as to what the law is or is not.
Of course, I don’t expect that all readers will be persuaded by this description of the
present political economy of constitutional law. My point here is more simply that this is a
legible account of American constitutional law in which there is no fixed verbal criterion of
legal validity, but a parastatal group that exercises control over the content of supreme law. It
is an account that you may think wrong on the facts (although you may well change your mind
when the Court’s majority is hostile to your ideology), but it is not an analytically incoherent
one.238
*

*

*

In short, bringing Hart’s famous account of law in The Concept of Law into conversation
with the polythetic account of law brings to light possibilities that are commonly ignored. The
distinctive, recurrent features of law do not emerge from an evolutionary process infused with
functional pressures. They are not adaptions, but borrowings. Hart’s fable is merely a just-so

See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621, 632 (1987) (“A
criterion of law is supreme … if norms adopted according to it take precedence over norms adopted by any
other procedure. The criterion about which that is true in the United States is the amending clause, article V, of
the Constitution.”). An obvious flaw in Greenawalt’s account is that it leaves no room for judicial precedent, and
offers no explanation of the hierarchical relation of different kinds of precedent
236 Craig Green, Deconstructing the Administrative State: Chevron Debates and the Transformation of Constitutional Politics,
101 B.U. L. REV. 619, 657 (2021) (describing “the sudden transition from conservative support for Chevron to
constitutional opposition” in 2016 as a consequence of changes to the Republican Party); see also Calvin
TerBeek, “Clocks Must Always Be Turned Back”: Brown v. Board of Education and the Racial Origins of Constitutional
Originalism, 115 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 821, 822 (2021) (developing the link between opposition to Brown and the
emergence of modern originalism).
237 Brian Leiter, Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme Court As Super-Legislature, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
1601, 1601 (2015).
238 For an excellent account, see Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 NYU L. REV.
1035, 1038-44 (2008) [hereinafter “Green, Inseparability”]
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story. And law is not necessarily tightly linked to officials, as opposed to a parastatal elite that
can determine the scope and content of supreme law.
B.

Decoupling Law from the Rule of Law?

The relation of law to moral values remains sharply contested in the jurisprudence
literature. Because Hart, in particular, has been associated (to varying degrees) with the thought
that there is no necessary connection between law and morality, we can start with his work
again to explore how a polythetic account of law bears on that question.
In The Concept of Law’s penultimate chapter, Hart describes and accepts five ways in
which law and morality might be connected; he rejects only one.239 Among those he accepts is
the notion that the practical realization to some extent of the “principles of legality”—which
means intelligibility, non-retroactivity, and the feasibility of actual compliance, and so is
roughly analogous to one meaning of the “rule of law”—is a prerequisite for effective “social
control,” even if it is at the same time also “compatible with great iniquity.”240 He rejects the
idea, however, that “enactments which enjoined or permitted iniquity should not be recognized
as valid.”241
This last claim is often juxtaposed with Lon Fuller’s argument that a “total failure to
meet [one of a number of principles of legality] does not simply result in a bad system of law,
but in something that is not properly called a legal system at all,” and thus no “moral
obligation” to obey such law.242 Hart’s response to this, on one reading, is that such law still
‘counts’ as law, even as it fails to satisfy a basic “aspiration of legality,” because it guides officials,
even if it does not guide ordinary subjects of the law.243 Law might excel qua law, indeed, but
still be pervasively and comprehensively unjust.244
If the account developed in Parts I and II does suggest some linkage between law and
legality, it is a rather different from the one Fuller posits. To begin with, the polythetic account
of law offered in The Rule of Laws severs the necessary connection between law and the
expectation of general compliance. Law that cannot guide, hence, is not a “total failure.”
Neither Hammurabi nor Justinian, recall, crafted laws that were, or seemingly were intended
to be, followed.245 Yet they typically are counted as law nonetheless. That may simply be to say
that the polythetic account of law is broader than the modern concept associated with both
Hart and Fuller. It is decoupled not only from the state but also from the proximate ambition
of general compliance; it hence leaves more space for aspirational and expressive functions of
law.

HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 202-11.
Id. at 207; see also id. at 206 (“[W]e have in the bare notion of applying a general rule of law, the germ at least
of justice.”).
241 Id. at 208.
242 FULLER, supra note 34, at 39; see also KRISTEN RUNDLE, FORMS LIBERATE: RECLAIMING THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF LON L FULLER 90-92 (2012) (explaining Fuller’s argument here in terms of the creation of a
“particular quality of relationship between the lawgiver and the legal subject,” characterized by “reciprocity”).
243 John Gardner, Hart on Legality, Justice and Morality, 1 JURISPRUDENCE 253, 257-59 (2010).
244 HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 185-86 (“[I]t is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce
or satisfy certain demands of morality, although they have often done so.”); Green, Inseparability, supra note 238,
at 1051. Jeremy Waldron has persuasively suggested that there is a “basic contradiction” in Hart’s responses to
Fuller. Waldron, Positivism and Legality, supra note 19, at 1157-59. I am leaning here on one strand of that
contradiction.
245 See supra text accompanying notes 215 to 216.
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More importantly, even if law is both intended and efficacious as a guide for practical
conduct by meeting the “principles of legality,” law’s potential to ground moral obligations in
the sense that Fuller intends remains unclear. On Fuller’s account, legality vouchsafes a
“particular quality of relationship between the lawgiver and the legal subject,” characterized
by “reciprocity”246 Such “reciprocity” arises at least in part from the sense that law entails some
mutuality: Just as it binds and guides the citizenry, so too it binds the exercise of (state) power.
At moments, this seems idea that Pirie embraces.247
Yet The Rule of Laws yields little to support that proposition, despite its kind words for
legality. Pirie offers a number of different formulations of a claim about the link between law
and the normative ambition of constraining power. Early on, she points to a historical “line of
legal instruments designed to curb the wrongful use of power” that is “as ancient as law
itself.”248 But it’s not at all clear the mere historical incidence of such laws is probative. Perhaps
it demonstrates the possibility that law can be deployed to modulate power, but it offers no
certainty of this effect. Indeed, Pirie’s account of imperial law in pre-Communist China suggests
that law need not have any constraining effect on a particularly powerful state.249 Nor indeed
is it obvious that the constraining effect of law is inconsistent with the ambition of law to
facilitate coercive power more generally. An influential theory of constitutional design, for
example, posits that ruling elites will converge on an organic law when doing so provides
“insurance” to protect their own interests in the future.250 A related account highlights the way
in which sovereign commitments to honoring property rights can facilitate desirable economic
growth that the sovereign requires.251 These accounts may or may not apply persuasively to
particular cases.252 But they are potent illustrations of the point that law may be used to
generate enabling constraints: These might protect those who already wield influence, while
leaving the marginal in the wind. The protection of property rights, which is often associated
with the rule-of-law ideal, may well hence be associated with an overall increase in the ability
of the powerful to act without constraint.253

RUNDLE, supra note 242, at 92.
PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 311 (“[I]n most legal systems, the laws also defined and limited how
power should be exercised …. This is the rule of law ….”).
248 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 14.
249 Id. at 96. On the other hand, Pirie also notes that “[l]ocal strongmen would sometimes find themselves facing
the discipline of law, as would corrupt officials.” Id. at 254. That is, law might not impose a constraint on state
power as an undifferentiated whole, but might allow apex officials to police line-officials at the behest of the
public. This is one way in which an undifferentiated notion of power is unsatisfying.
250 See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM 41 (2004) (describing the need for political actors who expect to lose power for
“insurance” through constitutional designs which protect their interests by facilitating their eventual return to
power).
251 See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing
Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 803-04 (1989) (arguing that “the sovereign or
government must not merely establish the relevant set of rights, but must make a credible commitment to
them,” and does this “by being constrained to obey a set of rules that do not permit leeway for violating
commitments”).
252 North and Weingast’s view, though, likely imputes intentional human agency where none in fact existed. Jon
Elster, Don't Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1751, 1785 (2003).
253 For an exploration of this dynamic in respect to contemporary American law, see Aziz Z. Huq, Property
Against Legality: Takings after Cedar Point, 101 VA. L. REV. – (forthcoming 2023) [hereinafter “Huq, Property against
Legality”]; see also JEREMY WALDRON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE MEASURE OF PROPERTY 61-65 (2012)
(developing a similar point).
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A different possibility is that law is necessary but not sufficient for the constraint of
power. It thus may provide the intellectual template through which such constraint can emerge.
In one of her earlier works, Pirie gestures at this claim. She suggests that the “process of
abstraction” embedded in law’s systematicity “led to the crucial distinction between person and
office” and hence “between the rule of law and the rule of man.”254 On Joseph Streyer’s famous
account of the state’s emergence, however, the impersonality enabled by law is not so much
the handmaiden of legality as an instrumentality of state power, and a result of the latter’s
emergence.255 Similarly, on Quentin Skinner’s view, it is only at the end of the sixteenth
century, as marked out by the publication of Bodin’s Six livres de le republique, that jurists start to
write of “something of more impersonal significance that rulers must preserve if they wish to
avoid a coup d’etat.”256The abstraction of law in Bodin, as in the work of Hobbes a century
later, does not mark out any constraint on those wielding power. It only emerges in the wake
of the absolute state, and is hence perfectly consistent with tyrannical power.
In a more speculative vein, it could be imagined that the creation of the impersonal idea
of the state may be associated with the emergence of certain dispositions necessary for legality—
sentiments such as loyalty, bureaucratic neutrality, and a distaste for nepotism. In this way, law
mediates the emergence of bureaucracy of a certain timbre to work as a constraint on state
power. I am skeptical. None of those qualities seems to me adequate on their own to impose
any predictable friction on the flexing of state power. As Hannah Arendt’s meditation on the
Eichmann trial suggested, loyalty to an abstract institution and bureaucratic orientation toward
the diligent execution of policy choices—shorn entirely of extra-institutional moral reflection—
can facilitate even the worst in humanity.257 Even the mundane operation of supposedly benign
regulatory agencies can lead to undesirable kinds of mission creep.258
Pirie’s most categorical assertion of the connection between law and constrained power
comes, revealingly, at the end of a chapter on the procedures for ascertaining truthful
testimony, whether by ordeal or oath, over time. In most legal systems, she says, “the laws …
defined and limited how power should be exercised…. This is the rule of law ….”259 In her
conclusion, she repeats that “laws set out a vision that people believe in [and] can … be used
against any power holder who tries to ignore them.”260 Alas, I do not see what in her
amplitudinous and eloquent history supports that optimism. So while I share Pirie’s professional
desire to assign what I do and teach the secure rank of a moral benediction, there is scant
evidence that in its actual operation, the law will often or always be used against “any power
holder,” or even that it tends to be used as such with the overall effect of bending the arc of
power toward humanity. Nor am I certain that it is a “recurrent feature[]”261 of the law as
polythetic category to achieve this salutary effect. Societies are too varied, the ambitions of
“power” too plural, and the vagaries of social forms too inconstant to find comfortable berth in
Pirie, Law before Government, supra note 32, at 221.
See STREYER, supra note 88, at 6 (describing the origin of the state in terms of “the formation of impersonal,
relatively permanent political institutions”).
256 Skinner, supra note 80, at 328.
257 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 287 (1992) (“Except
for an extraordinary diligence in looking after his own personal advancement, [Eichmann[ had no motives at
all.”); see also ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST 41 (1st ed. 1989) (exploring how crimes
have been a “conspicuous feature of modern bureaucracies ” existing so as to “dissociate evil from human
motives”).
258 For a criticism in this register, see Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881,
883-84 (2016).
259 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 311.
260 Id. at 453.
261 PIRIE, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 9.
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that certitude. Instead, the best we can do is to acknowledge, with regret, that the broader
history Pirie recounts provides surprisingly limited evidence of this constraining effect on
“power”, however that term is defined.
There is a second basis for concern about Pirie’s optimism, as well as Fuller’s claim
about “reciprocity,” buried here: There is no reason to think that the existence of law creates
expectations or beliefs among those subjected to power in ways that can be fairly characterized
as ‘reciprocity.’ Where Pirie addresses this question, her evidence cuts against Fuller’s claim.
Of Mesopotamian law, for example, Pirie suggests that people “needed laws as resources for
justice.”262 She does not back this claim up with any evidence of actual constraint being
experienced by Ur Namma or his successors. Writing of medieval Ireland, Pirie postulates that
laws “must have given people greater confidence to stand up to authoritarian behavior.”263 But
this again seems doubtful. Isn’t it equally possible that the sight of such clear laws being violated
by those in power had a demonstration effect? Rather than spurring people to resistance, they
were a manifest and constant reminder of how much less those in power needed to curry favor
with law. Law may matter not as a source of moral succor, but as a sound stage for
demonstrating the absolute character of a ruler’s power. Nor has the existence of law ever given
ordinary, rank-and-file legal officials much aid when it came to manifestly evil regimes: History
teaches that judges can be among the first to stumble, head-long and heedless, into the murk
of evil, so long as it can be framed in the correct casuistic form.264 We should not expect judges
to be heroes. The notion that a legal education furnishes the moral ballast to resist the evil use
of power is too strained to warrant serious consideration: Just look around you.
In addition, the centrality of hieratic elites in producing and maintaining law (which is,
recall, a recurrent feature of polythetic law) cuts against the idea that law is recurrently
characterized by “reciprocity” between the ruler and the ruled. To be sure, the history of law
contains moments at which hieratic groups resisted temporal power in ways that may have
generated an equilibrium between ruler and ruled.265 But there seem to be an equal number of
powerful counterexamples. For instance, Vedic scholars of the Indian subcontinent had
influence over the rajputs who depended on scholarly benediction for legitimacy.266 There is
little evidence, however, that they used such power for anything other than the selfish goal of
reifying social status in the form of a caste system.267 More generally, we should anticipate that
hieratic elites will be bent not toward the general good, but rather in the service of their own
idiosyncratic and selfish interests. Again, it is rather tempting to suggest that the evidence of
legal elites’ moral vacuity, and the futility of expecting legal education to inculcate virtue or
goodness, is readily available at any one of today’s elite law schools.
Here again, the example of Chinese law looms large as a counter-example. On Pirie’s
account, the Chinese “thought of their law as a system of norms created by their rules to bring
order to great empires.”268 Under the sign of Confucian conformity to familial and social
Id. at 43.
Id. at 183.
264 On the “exasperating” failure of even non-Nazi judges to resist evil orders under the Hitler regime, see Karl
Loewenstein, Reconstruction of the Administration of Justice in American-Occupied Germany, 61 HARV. L. REV. 419, 432
(1947).
265 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 139 (arguing that uluma of the Abbasid caliphate “insisted on the
rule of law” as against “powerful caliph[s]”); id. at 114 (same for Roman orators such as Cicero); id. at 349 (ruleof-law criticism of British imperialism).
266 Id. at 206.
267 Id. at 64-65.
268 Id. at 95.
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hierarchy, emperors could successfully resist the “possibility that they could be judged by their
own rules.”269 Instead of reciprocity, the “Legalist Confucian” model that characterized
Chinese law for two millenniums was characterized by an “ideal of political meritocracy.”270
Today, the Chinese political leadership, comprising the Chinese Community Party and its
leadership, are not constrained by law in the reciprocal sense Fuller suggests.271 Contemporary
Chinese law “simply does not attempt” to constrain state power, even as it aims to use law to
achieve policy ends.272 Some commentators suggest that social endorsement of law might
eventually generate “political” constraints on the Party.273 But to me that seems at best a dim
and distant aspiration.
More weakly, law, as a matter of historical regularity, has been associated with
normative assertion in the sense that it is a vehicle for making moral claims either on behalf of
a ruling power, or as between members of the same society. It is, in other words, a social
technique for evaluative denotation: It is the standard-form vocative prestidigitation by which
an ‘is’ can be offered as if it were an ‘ought.’ Legal enactments work as verbal vessels for
normativity whether or not the morality in question is spurious or malign, and without regard
to whatever blood and dirt encrust the vessel’s lips. In Green’s words, law “contains obligationimposing norms” and as such has “moral pretentions.”274 But to recognize as much is to say
“nothing about their soundness.”275 The social technique of law, indeed, may engender a
bespoke “political ideology” of “legalism,” which “holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule
following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.”276 While
legalism can be a “civilized” ambition, stabilizing an aspiration toward “decent
government,”277 it can also work great harm, even evil if it enables participants in the legal
system to forego their own moral judgments.
By demonstrating the heterogeneity of moral commitments advanced through law, in
short, Pirie’s account gives us reasons to be highly skeptical of claims that morality works as a
necessary condition precedent for ranking either a particular rule or a system as a whole as
“law.” Her account confirms Hart’s view that the benefits of the rule of law can be made
available on a “quite restrictive or discriminatory basis.”278 Indeed, the evidence that Pirie
marshals ultimately cuts against her own claim that laws have always “defined and limited how
power should be exercised” to produce “the rule of law.”279

Id. at 96; accord GLENN, supra note 42, at 324.
DANIEL A. BELL AND WANG PEI, JUST HIERARCHY: WHY SOCIAL HIERARCHIES MATTER IN CHINA AND
THE REST OF THE WORLD 72 (2020); id. at 74 (arguing that this ideal is “endorsed by the vast majority of the
people”).
271 Taisu Zhang and Tom Ginsburg, China's turn toward law, 59 VA. J. INT'L L. 306, 316 (2019).
272 Id. at 316-17; accord Ruiping Ye, Shifting meanings of fazhi and China’s journey toward socialist rule of law, 19 INT’L J.
CONST’L L. 1859, 1881 (2021) (“The Party promises to rule according to law, but one way of achieving this is to
change the law rather than change the style of ruling.”).
273 Zhang & Ginsburg, supra note 271, at 317.
274 Green, Inseparability, supra note 238, at 1048-49.
275 Id.
276 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1, 5 (1986).
277 Judith N. Shklar, In Defense of Legalism, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 19, 19 (1960).
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IV.

Law as Polythetic Category in Practice

It is hardly news that the aspiration toward legality in its most public-facing form
confronts many obstacles today.280 This Part takes up one such question. Violent crime and
state lawlessness in crime control both have intimate, if complex, historical, ideological, and
material connections to racial dynamics.281 It is therefore appropriate to ask whether a
polythetic account usefully sheds light on law’s relation to racial dynamics, and its capacity to
mitigate social pathologies linked to race.
The polythetic account of law I have refined from Pirie’s research works at a very high
level of generality. It would be wrong, even absurd, to try and illuminate variation within the
United States, or across decades of its history, with a category crafted to work across national
(and imperial) boundaries, and over centuries and millenniums. A synthetic category designed
to encompass variation within the taxon of law can’t do much to illuminate the different ways
in which law can be deployed either to advance or undermine projects of racial hierarchy under
specific historical circumstances. Most immediately useful on this score is a historically
grounded approach aiming to excavate the conditions under which legal institutions emerge.
A recent book by historian Elizabeth Hinton develops a sharp account of the conditions under
which both private and state violence emerge.282 Recent work by Alice Ristroph and David
Sklansky engages the important questions of how violence has been imagined as a problem in
the recent American past, with special attention to the roles of race and gender.283 Perhaps the
most pertinent example of this genre is Paul Gowder’s recent book, which offers a “panoptic
view of the American rule of law and its connection to the borders of membership” taking
account of racial dynamics.284
On Gowder’s view, law has been constitutive of the social forces that have generated a
subaltern classification of Blackness in the United States. At the threshold, he stresses the
economic centrality of slavery, which “challenge[d]” the rule of law through its propulsive
pressure toward expansion.285 Here, he adopts David Brion Davis’s view of slavery as a
fundamentally legal institution.286 Property, often seen as central to the rule of law,287 provided
an unraveling vector of anti-legality in the antebellum era. He then stresses the 1850 Fugitive
Slave Act,288 but gives surprisingly short shrift to post-Reconstruction state and federal laws
See supra text accompanying notes 3 to 4.
On the erasure of these connections in the core of criminal-justice discourse, see Alice Ristroph, The
Curriculum of the Carceral State, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1631, 1674 (2020) (“Rather than confronting the question of
racial judgment within “substantive” criminal law itself, in teaching affirmative defenses and inchoate offenses
the curriculum portrays racial bias as the property of an errant individual.”).
282 ELIZABETH HINTON, AMERICA ON FIRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF POLICE VIOLENCE AND BLACK
REBELLION SINCE THE 1960s (2021).
283 See Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571 (2011); DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY,
A PATTERN OF VIOLENCE: HOW THE LAW CLASSIFIES CRIMES AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR JUSTICE (2021).
284 GOWDER, supra note 4, at 17.
285 Id. at 40; id. at 49 (noting the interaction of economic incentives, the law of property, and “settler
republicanism”).
286 “Traditional definitions of slavery” have stressed a legal relation—that “the slave’s person is the chattel
property of another man or woman. DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF
SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 30 (2006). But cf. ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 32 (1982) (“The cardinal attribute of the condition of slavery was that the slave was a
person subject to domination.”).
287 See Huq, Property against Legality, supra note 253, at 1-2 (collecting sources to this effect, and developing an
argument that property rights can pose a threat to legality principles).
288 GOWDER, supra note 4, at 54-56.
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that worked to maintain the color line.289 Like many other scholars, Gowder also notes that the
breadth of contemporary criminal law invites dangerous discretion without effective ex post
checks on illegal force.290 On the other side of the ledger, Gowder underscores the legal
creativity of Blacks, even at moments of intense social and political stress, in articulating claims
to “equal legal rights and full citizenship.”291
The value of an intervention such as Gowder’s is its particular tracing of how law and
racial hierarchy interact. Specific engagement with this circuit begets skepticism. American law,
he concludes, lacks “tools necessary to effectively control the abuse of power.”292 Time and
again, popular demands for reform pressed by Black and brown interests are (when successful)
litigated out of existence,293 or simply ignored.294
What an account such as Gowder’s cannot offer, however, is an evaluation of law’s
immanent potential as an instrument for or against racial hierarchy. It is hard to tell, for
example, whether the dismaying trajectory he traces might have yielded different, less racially
iniquitous developments, or whether the Slaveholders had so “vast [a] breadth and fierce
confidence of political vision” that they would have always overwhelmed any rectificatory
project advanced through law in the early Republic,295 or whether the causal springs of
oppression lay yet deeper still. Gowder hence does not help us understand whether the choice
to use law, as opposed to other techniques of social organizations, conduces to hierarchy or
equitable social structures.296 He does not ask how recurrent social features of law either
conduce to or inhabit racial reform. It is here that the polythetic account of law can make a
contribution, although I think the insight here is very modest. By drawing attention to the
recurrent elements of law, that account tees up the question of law’s general orientation toward
projects or hierarchy or reconstruction. Corroborating Gowder’s generally pessimistic
conclusions, a pursuit of that question does not suggest strong reasons for threshold optimism
about law. Headwinds against racial reform are instead woven tightly into law’s warp and woof.
How then does the polythetic account bear on law’s relation to projects of emancipatory
racial reform? Recall once more that this definition picks out, inter alia, a characteristic
discourse (of analogy and casuistry) and the hegemonic power of a small elite. These features
counsel for pessimism, in the long term at least, about law’s redemptive potential.297
See Aziz. Z. Huq, The Private Suppression of Constitutional Rights, -- TEX. L. REV. – (forthcoming 2023) (discussing
Jim Crow contract law, and then the legal infrastructure of housing law, as instruments for the maintenance of
structural subordination).
290 GOWDER, supra note 4, at 116-21.
291 Id. at 71-72; id. at 78-79 (discussing role of Black activists in the welfare rights movement).
292 Id. at 175.
293 Id. at 89-95 (discussing early, unraveling judicial constructions of the Reconstruction Amendments).
294 See Aziz Z. Huq, Robert Vargas, and Caitlin Loftus, Governing Through Gun Crime: How Chicago Funded Police After
the 2020 BLM Protests, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. – (forthcoming 2022) (documenting strategies used to deflect the
Black Lives Matter protest demands in Chicago).
295 MATTHEW KARP, THIS VAST SOUTHERN EMPIRE: SLAVEHOLDERS AT THE HELM OF AMERICAN F OREIGN
POLICY 256 (2016).
296 In particular, Gowder might have said more about the way in which “the sexualized violence against, and
captivity of, Black people” constituted “conditions of possibility” for basic elements of the American
constitutional order, such as our system of presidential elections. FRANK B. WILDERSON III, AFROPESSIMISM
197 (2020). The ability to inter such “conditions of possibility” while advancing a putatively race-neutral
discourse of constitutional originalism is, I think, possible only in an ethical context characterized by legalism in
Shklar’s pejorative sense. SHKLAR, supra note 276, at 5.
297 A broader view of what “law” is, which took into account the sorts of social ordering to which legal pluralists
are attentive, would have a different answer to this inquiry. But the broader a definition of what law is, the more
289

42
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4152350

First, law is an intellectual system characterized by casuistic and analogic reasoning. It
relies on general categories as a means of pushing beyond specific cases.298 This tendency
toward abstraction makes it a capacious vessel for hierarchy-creating projects because it tilts
attention away from the specifics of human individuality, corporeality, and experience. Race is
not a natural or biological kind. It reflects, and helps to create, a knot of unequal, often harmful
social relations.299 The moral implications of race cannot be grasped without attention to the
specific harms, the particular indignities and despoilings, that historically embed and embody
racial categories. But legal terminology and forms of argumentation offer an embarrassing
array of opportunities for self-exculpation, evasion, and obfuscation.300 The very possibility of
abstraction creates, that is, a risk that the moral wrong associated with race will be missed or
purposefully avoided. To do law is thus, in some measure, to extricate oneself from the realm
of human pain and hurt wherein the harms of domination and subjugation are realized.
Formality and casuistry in reasoning can instead conduce to a numbing of the moral sense in
favor of a morally arid form of legalism.
Second, the taxon of race needs to be stabilized and propagated through society because
it lacks a biological or presocial predicate. It must be systematized across different parts of the
social field. An intellectual system that operates by fashioning durable abstractions upon which
power can be applied is, in a very obvious sense, well adapted to that task. And the casuistic
nature of legal reasoning means that the law may be well adapted to the creation of racial
categories through its ability to produce and disseminate taxonomizing nomenclatures. It is,
indeed, well established that law and legal institutions have played an important role in
stabilizing and disseminating racial categories though “the extension of racial meaning to …
previously racially unclassified relationship[s], social practice[s and] group[s].”301 Of course,
many of the instrumentalities of “racist” regimes work primarily through law.302 But even when
a court adjudicates a racial discrimination matter, it necessarily makes determinations of racial
identity. It hence reifies categories of racial identity.303
Third, it is plausible to think that law is better able to create than reverse racial
hierarchies. Law, which is organized around casuistry and analogy, is suited to the reification
of social categories such as race. It is likely less effective at dissolving those categories once they
vacuous becomes any claim of causal efficacy. If law is (almost) everything, that is, it would be a bit silly to ask
whether law had a causal effect.
298 See supra text accompanying notes 105 to 124.
299 Sally Haslanger, Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?, 34 NOUS 31, 44 (2000)
(noting that a race is a group “demarcated by the geographical associations accompanying perceived body type,
when those associations take on evaluative significance concerning how members of the group should be viewed
and treated... .”); see also DON HERZOG, POISONING THE MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 283-99 (1998)
(discussing different conceptions of race).
300 The classic study, of course, is ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1980).
301 MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 111 (3d ed. 2015); see also
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution in Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 35 (1991) (discussing the
“statutory histories of state racial classification schemes”); IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 6 (1996) (same); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998). Justices , however, have “consistently distanced the Court and
the law from responsibility for upholding racism and racist policies.” Kathryn Stanchi, The Rhetoric of Racism in the
United States Supreme Court, 62 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1254 (2021)
302 GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 100-01 (2002) (listing the “distinguishing features
of an overtly racist regime,” almost all of which take the form of laws).
303 Richard R.W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2023, 2091 (2006) (“But can there be court
recognition of race without court production of race? Of course not ….”).
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have become encumbered with material correlates.304 Once created, law’s categories may be
sticky. The close linkage between law and a hieratic elite implies that there will often not be
sufficient motivation to decouple law from hierarchy’s creation and maintenance. To be sure,
other potential roles for law are bidirectional. For instance, law can play a role in both in
concentrating and distributing the material advantages (e.g., schooling, housing, and a clean
environment) and material encumbrances (e.g., convictions, removal orders) that partially
constitute race. But my point is simply that law may have more tools for creating than eroding
hierarchy.
Fourth, law is associated as a sociological matter with a hieratic elite that is responsible
for generating and maintaining its integrity as an intellectual system. It thus tends to be
produced by a social elite, rather than by the population as a whole. It does not arise through
anything akin to all-encompassing social contracts imagined by thinkers such as Hobbes and
Rousseau. That hieratic elite, moreover, is likely to have interests that diverge systematically
from those of the balance of the polity. In the case of the Vedic tradition, for example, the
hieratic elite directly engaged in the production of legal justification and infrastructure for a
caste system.305 In perhaps the most influential treatment of intellectuals’ role in politics, the
Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci suggested that the “major part of intellectual activities” in
European history had been “ecclesiastical,” with interests quite distinct from those of the
population as a whole.306 Gramsci imagined the possibility of a new class of “organic”
intellectuals capable of standing alongside working people.307 But that vision, whatever its
merits, never came to pass. Instead, legal intellectuals are more akin to Jeremy Bentham’s
“Judge and Co.,” who “care for the rest of the mass of suffering … what a steam-engine would
care for the condition of a human body pressed or pounded by it.”308 It would, with this history
in mind, be surprisingly if the social technology of law, so reliant upon the actions and choices
of a small elite, tended often or easily toward emancipatory projects benefiting all.
For similar reasons, I am rather skeptical of the notion that law exercises a beneficial
effect merely through the regularizing force of procedural regularity.309 On this view, the fact
of writing down rules, and then having a judiciary to apply them, will generate good outcomes
more often than not. But it is not just that this “conveyer-belt” theory of law is implausible
given the insights generated by the polythetic theory of law. It is also that the history Pirie
recounts offers little basis for confidence that the hieratic elites responsible for husbanding the

It is not dispositive, but the history of colorblindness as an equality principle casts doubt on the ability of
courts to dissolve racial categories by the simple expedient of ignoring that. See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the
Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 85
(2000) (exploring ways in which “the discourse of color blindness itself works to disrupt and to rationalize the
practices that sustain group inequality”); Ian F. Haney López, ‘‘A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and
Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 988 (2007) (defining and criticizing “reactionary colorblindness”
as “an anticlassification understanding of the Equal Protection Clause that accords race-conscious remedies and
racial subjugation the same level of constitutional hostility”).
305 PIRIE, RULE OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 206.
306 ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 17 (Q. Hoare & G. Nowell Smith eds.,
1971); id. at 11 (suggesting that intellectuals traditionally arose from the “petty and middle landed bourgeoisie
and certain strata of the petty and middle urban bourgeoisie”).
307 Id. at 15-16.
308 Jeremy Bentham, Scotch Reform, Real Property, Codification Petitions, Petition of Justice in THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM (William Tait ed., 1843), https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/bowring-the-works-of-jeremy-bentham-vol5-scotch-reform-real-property-codification-petitions
309 The best known version of this argument is Fuller’s claim about the “inner morality” of the law. Fuller, supra
note 34, at 558-59.
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law will be anything more than sporadically attentive to the interests of a larger population that
might be advanced through law’s regularity or predictability.
I do not want to be misunderstood to suggest that law can never be a vehicle for racial
progress. That would be false. Rather, my more modest claim is that the social facts that
ordinarily make up law are such that any effort at its deployment toward racial justice will face
a built-in headwind. So an aspiration that “reason would someday become the currency of
law”310 may well be noble and even life-sustaining. But it is also an assertion of hope against
experience—the important, life-sustaining illusion that this time, just this one time in your
lifetime and not that of your children or their children, justice and legality will rhyme.
Conclusion
Law has had a four-thousand year run. As technologies go, this is not a bad life course,
and not a bad time for a reckoning. Drawing on that history, The Rule of Laws offers readers a
foundation for thinking closely about how law operates, and how it enables our moral best and
worst. It illuminates several ways in which the intuitive conveyer belt model of law—which I
discern beneath much modern thought about the law—misses the mark. It also helps us see
how law’s achievements ordering social and political life are irremediably intertwined with its
costs. Law has been a vessel for preserving peoples and gemeinschaft against exile, loss, and
conquest; but it is also a scalpel to craft social and racial caste, and a bludgeon for empire built
on the Tigris, the Ganges, the Dnieper, or the Potomac. Trying to unravel the harm it inflicts
from the productive human flourishing it enables is a Sisyphean task.
Law’s history also illuminates a chasm looming between the proud ambition of law
respecting the constraint on power and its reality. Even if law is a necessarily normative
enterprise, its normative constrain can be weak. As an instrument of Judith Shklar’s “liberalism
of fear” is inadequate, at least standing on its own.311 To tie one’s hope for a decent respect for
humanity to the mast of law, therefore, seems vain. Instead, with Auden again, it might be
better to “at least confine / Your vanity and mine,”312 to more timid claims, tendered closely
to historical experience, on law’s behalf. What advocates for a more just social order can
reasonably hope for from law is a rather modest matter.
Yet after four thousand years, the end of law is, perhaps, in sight. Machine-leaning tools
can, and increasingly are, deployed to extract correlations and associations from existing data.
They can now not only displace frontline enforcement discretion, but also produce
“personalized” legal rules313 and displace judges.314 Some of these predictions are more
plausible than others.315 There is no iron command of history directing the adoption and
dissemination of new technologies: The Rule of Laws, indeed, is testament enough to the variable
and uncertain path that technological adoption can take. Yet, if the most ambitious of the
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technologists’ predictions come to pass, law will no longer necessarily be an intellectual system
crafted by a hieratic elite contingently bound to the state. The cost functions of contemporary
machine-learning tools cannot be reduced to writing. Those tools are distinct precisely because
they write their own rules, rather than being given a functional form to apply. And once
implemented, they displace the casuistic and analogic reasoning that has characterized legal
elites for thousands of years. The question invited by power, and the project of its supposed
constraint, will necessarily modulate.
I am not sure we have learned enough about how law fails as it succeeds, or prevails
through disaster, to predict with confidence how this new technique for knowing and shaping
the social order will unfold. By looking backward with such acuity, The Rule of Laws offers a
surer ground for that endeavor, just as it helps us see better the limits and self-delusions of our
own craft.
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